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Summary
In this thesis technical eﬃciency and productivity are evaluated for use in per-
formance evaluation in incentive systems. In light of agency theory and the or-
ganizational context, these techniques have several promising attributes for use
in incentive schemes, despite their limited occurrence in the incentive literature.
The use of data envelopment analysis (DEA) for estimating technical eﬃciency
limit subjective evaluations and eliminate unwanted Nash-equilibrium under com-
parative evaluation. The Hicks-Moorsteen index prove to be the preferable index
for measuring productivity change, as it cope with technologies exhibiting globally
variable returns to scale. By coupling DEA and Hicks-Moorsteen we get four linear
programs, which are easy to solve with developed software. However, infeasibility
might occur when estimating the index and no remedies to this problem exist in
the literature. Infeasibility will not occur for continuous time indexes or when
estimating technical eﬃciency with Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). However,
SFA is poor on other aspects and software incorporating continuous time indexes
are yet to be developed.
The use of productivity as a method for performance evaluation might oﬀset sys-
tematic bias for comparative evaluation in heterogeneous environments, and will
in most cases give employees strong incentives to improve. Technical eﬃciency
might induce eﬃcient employees to only maintain their level of eﬀort, but super
eﬃciency models reduce this threat. When computing technical eﬃciency, envi-
ronmental factors should be adjusted for through a stepwise regression procedure
in order to reduce uncontrollable risk. Although the goal is to implement a model
that minimize subjective evaluations that might lead to favoritism, a ﬁnal expert
judgment should verify or disprove the performance scores.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The development of employee performance is central to the continuous improve-
ment of all organizations, which might be facilitated through the implementation
of an incentive system. A successful incentive system relies on a balanced relation-
ship between performance and rewards, inducing the employees to increase their
eﬀort on performing tasks. But how will individuals or groups behave when they
are evaluated and this evaluation aﬀects how they are rewarded? How do we know
that an evaluation correctly assesses overall performance?
Empirical research has shown that biased and inaccurate performance evaluation
reduces productivity by reducing the eﬀectiveness of incentives in the organization
(Baker et al. 1988), which in turn reduces organizational performance. As an
unbiased and accurate performance evaluation technique is of key importance for
a functional incentive system, this thesis is dedicated to an explicit evaluation of
diﬀerent evaluation techniques. In academic and empirical research some attention
has been brought upon the applicability of techniques such as Balanced Scorecard
and subjective assessments, but evaluations of measures derived from estimates of
production technology seems to be missing. Because the latter class of measures
are widely accepted and supported in the ﬁeld of operations research and only has
received limited attention in incentive systems, such measures will be the main
focus in this thesis. The ultimate objective is to identify the most promising
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evaluation scheme to be incorporated in a variety of organizations  encouraging
optimal decision making while limiting the eﬀects of inaccuracy and bias.
1.2 Analytical Framework
In the following, an analytical framework for evaluating the applicability of per-
formance measures in incentive systems will be established. An incentive system
can be thought of as a scheme which communicates strategy, motivates employees,
and reinforces achievement of organizational goals. In order to conceptualize this
scheme, an intuitive representation is illustrated in ﬁgure 1.1. This cycle depicts
INCENTIVE
MOTIVATION
PERFORMANCE
Figure 1.1: The incentive system: A schematic representation of the ideal world
the relationship between incentives, motivation and performance, but is limited in
a practical sense, as it reﬂects an ideal world. In this ideal world we believe that a
given level of motivation is perfectly converted to the employees eﬀort on fulﬁlling
his designated tasks. These tasks are believed to be optimally set up to capture
the goals of the organization, and are perfectly measurable by a performance eval-
uation scheme. The performance score received is then optimally aligned with a
justiﬁed incentive which stimulates the employees' motivation to increase eﬀort.
In a real world application this simplistic representation fail to capture important
aspects and a more realistic representation is suggested in ﬁgure 1.2. As opposed
to the ideal world representation, motivation is believed to stimulate eﬀort spent
on gaming and eﬀort spent on fulﬁlling tasks. Gaming will be covered in section
2.2, and point to the situation where an employee seek to maximize a performance
score while minimizing eﬀort. This situation is likely to occur if the performance
evaluation is not aligned with the goals of the organization, and a gap exists be-
tween real and measured performance. Even though a performance evaluation
2
INCENTIVE
MOTIVATION
PERFORMANCE
gaming eort nature
realmeasured
organizational goals
Figure 1.2: The incentive system: A schematic representation of the real world
distinguishes between gaming and eﬀort, it might fail to capture the true per-
formance of the employee. First, poorly communicated evaluation criteria might
induce the employee to waste eﬀort on tasks not contributing to value creation,
even without gaming the system. Second, the performance of an employee might
be aﬀected by the states of nature. Nature reﬂects the environment's impact on
performance, which can be both negative or positive, systematic or unsystematic.
If not adjusted for, this might lead to an over- or underestimation of the per-
formance of the employee, so that the incentive rewarded is unjust. Finally, the
incentives provided do not necessarily lead to increased motivation.
The representation in ﬁgure 1.2 is more complex than ﬁgure 1.1 and reveals impor-
tant relationships and pitfalls in the incentive system. These relationships will be
investigated in further detail, except the link between performance and incentives
and incentives and motivation.
A manager should be aware of the diﬀerence between intrinsic and extrinsic motiva-
tion, denoting the motivation for a task itself and the motivation from a separable
outcome respectively. Intrinsic motivation is considered to be more powerful and
is more likely to result in a desired outcome than extrinsic reward (Bates 1979;
Motivation for learning), but it might still be corrupted by extrinsic rewards. In
a discussion paper by Courty et al. (2008) the authors treat how the intrinsic
motivation of employees in a Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) program was
corrupted by introducing pay for performance. While the employees initially found
pleasure in providing jobs for the most needed, the introduction of an incentive
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program lead to cream-skimming where jobs were mainly given to those who were
most likely to succeed. It is clear that considerable attention should be brought
to the relationship beteween motivation and incentives as well as the eﬀect of dif-
ferent incentives. The interested reader should look up an article by Clark and
Wilson (1961) on a treatment on monetary and non-monetary incentives.
1.3 Outline
The conceptualized incentive system will form the analytical framework for eval-
uating performance measures. In chapter 2, the fundamentals of performance
evaluation are treated, where section 2.1 regards performance evaluation in an or-
ganizational context and section 2.2 treat strategic responses and risk. The key
observations from chapter 2 will provide the basis for the establishment of favorable
properties which a performance evaluation technique should possess. These prop-
erties are summarized in section 2.3.2, where explicit criteria are selected and will
be used to evaluate diﬀerent techniques. Chapter 3 contains explicit evaluations
of common techniques for performance evaluation in incentive systems, following
with an evaluation of technical eﬃciency and productivity in chapter 4. Chapter 4
is introduced with a formal theoretical introduction to productivity and technical
eﬃciency, including an evaluation of the conceptual diﬀerence between measur-
ing eﬃciency and productivity change. In section 4.3 and 4.4 speciﬁc techniques
for estimating technical eﬃciency and productivity will be treated respectively.
Chapter 5 combine the virtues of chapter 3 and 4 in a simultaneous evaluation
and a scheme for performance evaluation is proposed. Chapter 6 summarizes and
concludes the past chapters as well as suggesting further work.
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Chapter 2
The Fundamentals of
Performance Evaluation
2.1 The Organizational Context
In the following section the focus is directed towards the link between organi-
zational objectives and performance evaluation as depicted in ﬁgure 1.2. When
evaluating performance in an organizational context one should pay attention to
the employee's eﬀort spent on fulﬁlling value adding actions, that conform with
organizational goals. In this section, possible strategic choices to performance
evaluation are neglected and employees are regarded as machines, only performing
actions that are evaluated.
2.1.1 Capturing Value Adding Actions
In an incentive scheme we seek to measure and reward value adding actions, striv-
ing towards business excellence. This can be conceptualized by adapting the no-
tation used by Baker (2002) and investigate the relationship between measured
performance and created value. If V denotes the value of the organization and
PM the performance measurement, the following formulation represent the per-
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formance evaluation problem:
V (a, ) = f ∗ a+ 
and
PM(a, φ) = g ∗ a+ φ
where
V : ﬁrm value
a : n-dimensional vector of actions an employee can take {a1, a2, · · · , an }
f : n-dimensional vector of marginal product of actions in a with
negative or positive contribution {f1, f2, · · · , fn }
g : n-dimensional vector of marginal product of actions in a on the
performance measure {g1, g2, · · · , gn}
 : random eﬀects inﬂuencing the value of the ﬁrm
φ : random eﬀects inﬂuencing the performance measure
The stronger correlation between V and PM , the better is our performance mea-
sure in capturing value adding actions. The random eﬀects  and θ might be
correlated through common causes, both positively and negatively. For instance,
let's assume that we are evaluating the performance of car salesmen and that there
has been a recent increase in oil prices. This is likely to lower the expected sale of
petrol cars while increasing the sale of hybrid cars. If salesmen were evaluated by
the volume of sold cars, the performance of a hybrid car salesman would increase
while the performance of a petrol car salesman would decline. The value of the
entire ﬁrm is inﬂuenced by the expected value of future sales and would increase
if the increased sale of hybrid cars surpassed the decline in sale of petrol cars.
If it did,  and θ would be positively correlated for the hybrid car salesman and
negatively correlated for the petrol car salesman.
The correlation between V and PM will increase as the vector g is more aligned
with f , or that corr(∆V, g∆a) > 0. Otherwise we could experience that the
increase in performance actually leads to a decrease in value. This special case leads
to another implication of performance evaluation: the fact that the performance
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of one unit might negatively aﬀect the performance of another unit1. Therefore
we have to evaluate if we should assess the performance of a group of employees
or individuals. The dimension of time also complicates the relation between V
and PM , as PM often measures past or present performance, while V more often
evaluates future performance.
Another useful and perhaps more intuitive representation of the problem of cap-
turing value adding actions can be made through the Venn diagram in ﬁgure 2.1
combined with set theory. By using the same notation as earlier, we can see that
a
PM
V
Figure 2.1: A venn diagram depicting the relation between PM and V
actions a denote the entire sample space while PM and V are subsets. The in-
tersection between PM and V (PM ∩ V ) represents actions that are both adding
actions and are captured by the performance measurement, which we seek to max-
imize. The area PM \ V represents actions that are measured but that does not
add any value to the organization. This area represents the worst case scenario
where workers are encouraged to perform non-value adding actions, thus lowering
the value of the organization. We will not pay much attention to this extreme case
and rather focus on the Venn diagram in ﬁgure 2.2. Here PM is a subset of V ,
reﬂecting the case where we do not manage to capture all value adding actions.
Failing to capture important value adding actions might lead to sub-optimal de-
cision making, thus failing to capture the goals of the organization. Piece-rate
workers might for instance sacriﬁce quality for quantity in order to achieve a better
performance score. In the Lincoln Electric Company, the performance of stenog-
1Such as market cannibalization or in value chains.
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aPM
V
Figure 2.2: PM is a small subset of V
raphers was measured by counting the number of times the typewriter keys were
operated. The company later discovered that one employee was earning much
more than the others, and further investigation revealed that the worker ate her
lunch at her desk, eating with one hand while punching the most convenient key
as fast as she could (Berg and Fast 1975). Even though measuring the number of
keys operated capture a desired action, the marginal production of g on PM was
constant while the marginal production of f on V was decreasing. In this case it is
likely that she was aware of the outcome of her actions, but in other cases it might
not be so. For the sake of completeness we will therefore provide a framework
for selecting appropriate measures ensuring organizational conformity. One ﬁnal
note is that many companies use stock prices performance for CEO evaluation,
as stock prices should reﬂect unbiased estimates of ﬁrm value. However, this will
impose a risk on the CEO as the stock price most probably will be aﬀected by
uncontrollable events.
2.1.2 Ensuring Organizational Conformity
As mentioned when introducing the incentive system, the implementation will not
be successful unless the performance measurements are consistent with the ob-
jectives of the organization. Our ultimate goal when selecting measures, is to
identify parameters that inﬂuence the value of the organization, favorable or un-
favorable. This might be diﬃcult in practice and sometimes it might be better
identifying measures that conform with organizational goals. Folan and Browne
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(2005) covered this topic in an excellent way, focusing on the importance of per-
formance measurements as an integrated part of an organization's performance
management. The book Business performance measurement: theory and prac-
tice by Neely (2002) is also a good source for answering this question. In order
to establish parameters to evaluate the performance of employees, we can adopt
the framework developed by Keegan et al. (1989). They separated the parameters
in a two-by-two matrix with internal/external and cost/non-cost, which provides
a balanced measurement of the performance of the employees. Kaplan and David
(1992) extended this framework to capture subjective/objective and driver/out-
come, establishing what we know as the Balanced Scorecard.
Driver versus outcome
While outcomes are observed products of an unit, drivers are the forces causing
those outcomes. For example, customer satisfaction might be a driver for further
sales and research and development might be a driver for innovation. It is therefore
important to consider both drivers and outcomes when selecting measures for
performance evaluation, as this will capture both causes and eﬀects and balance
long-run versus short-run performance.
Long-run versus short-run
If an organization seeks long-run rather than sort-run success, performance mea-
sures should reﬂect this goal. Even though an organization might have short run
obligations which should be met, failing to focus on long-run indicators might
put a premature end to its success. Long-run and short-run measures are highly
correlated to drivers and outcomes respectively.
Internal versus external
While internal measures reﬂect operational performance, external measures reﬂect
strategic performance. Because decision making on an operational level is consid-
ered short-run and strategic decisions are considered as long-run, these dimensions
are related. The diﬀerence is the explicit formulation of external measures, which
are focused against external stakeholders.
Subjective versus objective
While objective measures are easier to quantify and use in a performance evalua-
tion, these measures might be easier to distort and their data might also be noisy.
Subjective measures might oﬀset distortion and risk through ex post evaluation,
but are more diﬃcult to quantify. The use of subjective measurements might also
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lead to favoritism resulting in a biased performance measure.
Financial versus non-ﬁnancial
In an article by Ittner and Larcker (2000) the authors list advantages and disad-
vantages of non-ﬁnancial over ﬁnancial measures. They state that non-ﬁnancial
measures are more aligned with long-term organizational strategies and that ﬁ-
nancial metrics generally focus on short-term performance. By measuring both
ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial performance, managers are provided incentives to fo-
cus on long-term strategy and intangible assets, intellectual capital and customer
loyalty, which are assumed to be better indicators of the future value of an orga-
nization. On the other hand, non-ﬁnancial measures might be more diﬃcult and
time-consuming to evaluate and might lack a common denominator. Non-ﬁnancial
metrics should therefore be organizational speciﬁc and be chosen in a dynamic
process as strategies and competitive environments evolve.
2.1.3 Dynamic and Static Performance Evaluation
Apart from choosing the appropriate measures, one should determine whether
performance should be evaluated status quo or by examining the development
from one period to the other. But how will this choice aﬀect the performance
of an employee and what factors might inﬂuence the estimation of performance?
These question will be repeated when productivity change and technical eﬃciency
are compared in section 4.2, and will for now be treated on a conceptual level.
Evaluating performances status quo might also be denoted temporal evaluation
or static evaluation. The objective is to compare a unit against a benchmark
or against other units in the same period, thus neglecting the dimension of time.
Dynamic evaluation seeks on the other hand to measure change in performance,
where a unit is measured against its performance in another period or how it
has developed compared to its peers. Dynamic evaluation might also go by the
term trend study, where we try to spot the pattern in development. From an
operational point of view, static performance evaluation is good for ﬁnding best
practice and help in eliminating ineﬃcient operations. From a strategic point of
view, dynamic performance evaluation is more suited for capturing the develop-
ment in performance and provides a better understanding of how an organization
evolves.
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Although dynamic performance evaluation is more attractive for capturing devel-
opment in performance, it is more likely to be biased by inaccurate and inconsistent
measures than static evaluation as more parameters are involved. A dynamic mea-
sure is also often constructed by two or more static measures, so that the variability
is expected to be at least as large as for static measures. By decomposing evalu-
ated performance into components which aﬀects the calculation, possible sources
to variability in cross-sectional and panel data are identiﬁed in ﬁgure 2.3.
Evaluated Performance
Nature Comparison
Measures
Business Strategy/
Objective
NoiseConsistency
Others
Benchmark
Itself
SystematicUnsystematic
Weighting Parameters
Figure 2.3: Aspects inﬂuencing performance evaluation
Some of these aspects are ﬁxed for static performance evaluation, such as business
strategy/objective and comparison. Business strategy/objective reﬂect which
parameters that are selected and how they are combined in an overall assessment.
Comparison is how we anchor a performance in order to rank how good the
performance is. For ﬁxed evaluation this might either be compared to units in
the same period or a benchmark or reference technology. In a dynamic perfor-
mance evaluation, all aspects might change from one period to the other. Business
strategy might have changed, so that other measures and weights are selected.
Systematic and unsystematic inﬂuences of nature regard market ﬂuctuations and
systematic heterogeneity, and stochastic states of the operational environment re-
spectively. E.g., a company evaluating the performances of diﬀerent local stores
may experience that seasonable market ﬂuctuations have a large impact on trend
analysis. Systematic heterogeneity reﬂects diﬀerences between operational envi-
ronments, where some stores might operate under more stringent conditions than
11
others. Unsystematic inﬂuence of nature and measurement noise will aﬀect all
units, both static and dynamic, but is likely to have a larger impact on dynamic
evaluation when multiple static measures are combined. Measurement consistency
points to consistency between units and periods, where evaluated performance
might change between periods simply because we have adapted other methods for
reporting data.
From the observations above, we might suspect performance evaluation based on
dynamic evaluation to be more biased than those based on static evaluation. While
this seems like an indisputable fact, dynamic measures might distinguishing sys-
tematic from unsystematic inﬂuences of nature, thus being capable of detecting
heterogeneity between units. This is an important observation, as heterogeneity
might cause performance scores to be over- or underestimated under peer eval-
uation. For instance, socio-economic factors that are geographically contingent
might cause bank branches with a particular kind of customers to perform worse
than others. This is not captured by static evaluations, but by using dynamic
measures the eﬀect of socio-economic factors on performance scores will diminish
since a unit is measured relative to itself. Additional implications of dynamic and
static measures will be treated in section 4.2. A ﬁnal summary on the diﬀerence
between dynamic and static measures is that static measures do not adjust for
sources to bias and inaccuracy implicit, while dynamic measures might if bias is
systematic. Dynamic measures might on the other hand introduce additional bias
if the operational environment has changed from one period to another. Therefore,
it seems wise to adjust static measures for the components in ﬁgure 2.3, while dy-
namic measures should be adjusted for ﬂuctuations between periods and changes
in business strategies.
2.1.4 Implementation Properties of Performance Evaluation
Even if the optimal parameters are selected ensuring organizational conformity
while perfectly capturing value adding actions, the incentive system might fail if
the implementation is poor. User acceptance and monitoring are amongst critical
factors for success, in combination with top management support (Pinto and Slevin
1987). In order to satisfy these critical factors, one should stress the importance
of an attractive and credible performance evaluation scheme. Attractivity and
credibility are often used as traits of a person that are likely to inﬂuence how a
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message is perceived by its receiver, but will in the following be adopted to traits
of performance evaluation techniques.
Attractivity is traditionally linked to how the physical likability of a person aﬀects
how we perceive their message. When redeﬁned in terms of an incentive system,
attractivity is used as a collective term for attributes aﬀecting user likability of
an evaluation scheme. E.g. a technique for performance evaluation is likely to be
regarded as attractive if the methodology is easy to communicate to both man-
agers and employees. It is also important that the methodology is transparent for
those who are evaluated, so that they have a clear understanding of how their per-
formance is assessed. As low transparency might negatively aﬀect the employees'
commitment to the incentive system, this is an important factor to stress.
Credibility denotes a collective term for perceived procedural justice and corre-
spondence with production theory. Whether or not an evaluation scheme conform
to production theory might be diﬃcult to determine, but point to the fact that a
reward should be non-decreasing in increased eﬀort. When the optimal parameters
are selected, this is equivalent to an evaluation scheme where a performance score
improve as the fraction of output to input increase. Procedural justice reﬂects
the evaluated employee's perception of inﬂuences of subjectivity and favoritism,
which might lead to biased estimates. A high perception of procedural justice will
increase the organizational commitment and participation in the incentive system,
as stressed by Folger and Konovsky (1989). Recent research also support these
predictions where inequity in procedural justice is associated with job satisfaction
(Tremblay et al. 2000), absenteeism and turnover. A technique should also be
consistent between units and evaluation periods to yield credible results.
2.2 Strategic Responses and Risk
As depicted in ﬁgure 1.2, gaming in incentive systems might lead to biased perfor-
mance scores and undesirable results for an organization. In 1956, Ridgway wrote
about dysfunctional consequences of performance measurements, and an empirical
investigation of gaming responses to explicit performance incentives was conducted
by Courty and Marschke in 2004. Figure 1.2 also contain the exogenous variable
Nature, which imposes risks and heterogeneity to the performance evaluation.
Section 2.2 will introduce agency theory, where these issues are reviewed in detail.
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2.2.1 The Incentive Game
The incentive system will be considered as a game with two or more players: The
principal(s) and the agent(s). The principal(s) can be considered as stakehold-
ers representing the interest of an organization, while the employees are agents.
We assume that the agents are bounded rational, opportunistic and eﬀort averse
(Simon 1976, Williamson 1985), so that they will minimize their eﬀort while max-
imizing their utility to their best knowledge. At the same time, the principal seeks
to maximize the value of the organization or its outputs2 (Jensen and Meckling
1976).
Because the principal engages an agent to perform a task on their behalf by del-
egating decision making authority, it is likely that conﬂicting interests lead to
suboptimal decisions (Jensen 1983). We typically assume that the agents have
private information regarding their eﬀort, unobservable to the principal, resulting
in asymmetric information which creates a potential for moral hazard.
In order to mitigate this eﬀect the principal can put eﬀort into monitoring or com-
pensating the agent to achieve desired behavior (Jensen and Meckling 1976). The
latter instrument is known as optimal contracting, where the goal is to maximize
the outcome for the principal. Performance can be signaled through actions or the
result of these actions as captured by a performance evaluation. The principals
objective is to balance behavioral-based pay and outcome-based pay without im-
posing to much risk and variability on the agent (Gibbons and Murphy 1990). The
risk element becomes an important factor as the information about the nature is
incomplete. Nature, as depicted in ﬁgure 1.2 refers to luck, ease of performing the
task and other aspects that might skew the performance in a positive or negative
direction. The nature imposes a risk on the agent, which we label uncontrollable
if the agent cannot react to it and controllable otherwise (Gibbs et al. 2009).
The game described above can be recognized as a production game (Rasmusen
2007), which serves as a good starting point. In this game the monetary value
of output is denoted by q(e, θ), increasing with the eﬀort of the agent, e. θ ∈ R
denotes the state of the world and is chosen by nature with assumed probability
density f(θ). The agent's utility function, U(e, w) is decreasing with eﬀort and in-
creasing with wage, w. In an output-based wage under uncertainty, the principal's
2The ultimate goal for a proﬁt organization might be maximizing stock value. A non-proﬁt
organization might on the other hand seek to maximize the quality of their services or to maximize
socio-economic welfare.
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problem becomes:
max
w(·)
EV ((q(e˜, θ)− w(q(e˜, θ))) (2.1a)
subject to
e˜ = eargmaxEU (e, w(q(e, θ))) (2.1b)
U´ ≤ EU (e˜, w(q(e˜, θ))) (2.1c)
The ﬁrst constraint is the incentive compatibility constraint inducing the agent to
choose desired eﬀort, while the second is the participation constraint. These are
included because an agent is free to reject participating in the incentive system
and must be given an incentive to choose the desired eﬀort.
While the principal is considered to be risk neutral, agents are most often thought
of as being risk averse since it is assumed that they don't like a high variability in
their compensation (Stiglitz 1987). This gives rise to the problem of balancing the
agent's eﬀort and risk aversion (Jensen and Meckling 1976), and agency theory
states that the agents should be provided with some kind of insurance to accept
risk. This insurance is often provided through base-pay. If the agent on the other
hand had been risk seeking, he would accept a lower premium and would choose a
mainly output-based wage. The presence of risk might induce the agent to place
eﬀort on less risky tasks in order to bring more certainty to their performance
pay. By accounting for risk explicitly we might reduce its eﬀects on performance
evaluation so that we can lower the premium and make the agent less reluctant to
execute risky tasks. For further treatment of risk in incentive systems, the reader
is advised to look up an interesting paper written by Bloom and Milkovich (1997),
covering theory and empirical results.
2.2.2 Asymmetric Information
When measuring the performance of employees, we should ask whether we should
measure eﬀort or outcome. This question might seem counterintuitive, as output
rather than eﬀort increase the value of an organization. While this is true for the
organization as a whole, measuring output and neglecting eﬀort gives the agent
the favor of asymmetric information. As the agent's eﬀort is unobservable by the
principal, an opportunistic agent might choose to keep this information private
and spend a minimum of eﬀort to complete his tasks. This is especially the case if
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the performance measurements are not carefully selected, so that eﬀort becomes
measurable. If an agent is working as a car salesman and increase the number of
sold hybrid cars simply because the price of petrol has gone up, it would not be
eﬃcient to provide an incentive. If this information is private to the agent and
he beneﬁts from receiving a higher bonus, we denote this moral hazard. In fact,
if the agent had private information that indicated increased number of sold cars
independent of his eﬀort, the opportunistic agent could be induced to reduce his
eﬀort and still receive a bonus.
Issues regarding moral hazard are likely to increase as the monitoring of the agents
eﬀort become diﬃcult, and with the use of absolute performance evaluation. In a
scheme with absolute performance evaluation, the performance of one employee is
not aﬀected by others, as they are all measured against a benchmark. In the case of
a multi-period game, the employees actually have an incentive to lower their eﬀort
hoping that the benchmark is lowered. If we on the other hand incorporate rela-
tive performance evaluation with multiple players, we get the classical prisoner's
dilemma (ﬁgure 2.4). Clearly, the best option is to perform as good as possible,
EMPLOYEE A
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Figure 2.4: The pay-oﬀ matrix. Eﬀort is given on the axis (High/Low) while pay-oﬀ is
given inside the 2-by-2 matrix. Pay-oﬀ in L/L is higher than in H/H since the eﬀort in
H/H is higher than in L/L while the bonus remains the same.
as this will make the employee look good compared to the others. Unfortunately,
measuring relative performance might aﬀect knowledge-sharing and helping oth-
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ers in a negative direction, and we might get an unhealthy competition between
the employees. The principal should therefore measure and emphasize knowledge-
sharing in such a system (Lee and Ahn 2005). An important observation from
ﬁgure 2.4 is that the eﬀort spent in equilibrium H/H is higher than in L/L, so
that collaboration between employees might oﬀset the advantage of relative per-
formance evaluation. Another issue with relative performance measurement is that
the basis of comparison gets worse as the number of employees decrease. Accord-
ing to the law of large numbers, the sample mean of a large number of employees
is more likely to reﬂect expected performance, than that of a small number of em-
ployees. With a small sample space, extreme performances and random outcomes
may come more into play, causing outliers to have too much inﬂuence on peer
evaluation. Increased monitoring of the employees is therefore a better, but more
costly, solution as the number of employees decrease. Matsushima (2010) com-
bined relative and absolute evaluation in intergroup competition and prove that
this eliminate unwanted Nash equilibria. Note that the use of comparative eval-
uation undermines the agent's information advantage as the principal gets more
information, thus lowering the information rent captured by the agents.
Moral hazard is normally at hand when one of the players have private informa-
tion about the operational environment, and cooperate with a less informed part.
While constructing a performance evaluation in the incentive system, this is ac-
tually equivalent to not modeling the impact of nature3, visible to both principal
and agent. A good performance evaluation should therefore be able to adjust for
environmental factors as far as possible.
2.2.3 Distortion and Dysfunctional Responses
Even though we are aware of how moral hazard might corrupt the incentive sys-
tem, it is diﬃcult to completely eliminate the threats. The main treats while
implementing a performance measurement, is that it might not conform with the
goals of the organization and that an agent might manipulate the measurement.
For instance, performance measures elicit dysfunctional and unintended responses
because the employees, through their daily work, gain a superior understanding of
how the measurement system works and how performance outcomes can be ma-
nipulated (Marschke and Courty 2003). If an piece-rate worker is only measured
3alternatively macro shock
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by the number of outputs, he will have an incentive to decrease quality in order
to increase speed. This behavior is denoted dysfunctional response. The organi-
zation can ﬁght this behavior by introducing multiple measurements, but this will
give raise to the multitasking problem where the agent have to split its eﬀort over
multiple tasks (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991a;b). How the agent split its eﬀort
may be inﬂuenced by several factors, preferably by top management decisions. A
risk-averse agent might on the other hand choose to focus on performing tasks
with low uncontrollable risk.
To ensure that employees spread their eﬀort, it is common to use some kind of
aggregation where the principal put diﬀerent weights on each of the measures.
Placing optimal weights is diﬃcult in practice and the employees are induced to
lobby about the speciﬁcation of the weights.
2.2.4 Agency Cost and Transaction Cost
Agency cost incur in any situation involving cooperative eﬀort as a result of im-
personal exchange. This cost was deﬁned by Jensen and Meckling (1976) as the
sum of:
1. the monitoring expenditures by the principal
2. the bonding expenditures by the agent
3. the residual loss
The term agency cost is often used interchangeably with transaction cost, which
occur under contracting (Williamson 1979) and is divided in ex ante and ex post
costs. In our case, we can think of ex ante costs as costs related to getting an
incentive scheme into place and communicate its applicability to its users. Ex
post costs are on the other hand related to enforcing, monitoring and coordinating
the incentive system.
Even though agency and transaction cost have slightly diﬀerent applications, both
terms point to the fact that collaborative eﬀort give rise to additional costs. These
costs do not bring any value to the organization and we can think of them as
waste, which we seek to minimize. In the following, the term transaction cost
will be designated all costs related to developing, implementing and enforcing an
incentive system. As the focus of this thesis is performance evaluation, transaction
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costs will emphasize on costs related to measuring performance. Eﬀort and time
spent on specifying weights and handle lobbyists are two examples of transaction
costs that are likely to occur.
2.3 Criteria for Performance Evaluation
As discussed so far in chapter 2, evaluating performance is not a straightforward
task. We have reviewed how employees might behave when they are evaluated in an
incentive system, and shed light on the objective of balancing multiple measures
assessing overall performance. The past chapters have established a theoretical
and empirical foundation for evaluating the applicability of diﬀerent evaluation
schemes, and in this section criteria for performance evaluation will be estab-
lished. First, a short guide for selecting suitable measures will be given. Secondly,
and more importantly in this thesis, favorable characteristics of a performance
evaluation technique will be proposed.
2.3.1 Criteria for Selecting Suitable Measures
Since our intention is to evaluate the performance of a speciﬁc employee or group,
the parameters should measure the result of actions carried out by those who are
evaluated and not by some external event. The number of sold units might for
example be inﬂuenced by ﬂuctuations in demand, which impose an uncontrollable
risk on the sales manager. We might not always be able to distinguish controllable
from uncontrollable risk, but a careful selection of parameters might mitigate the
eﬀect of uncontrollable risk. It is also important to select measures that are less
likely to be manipulated or distorted by the employee. We might argue that the
performance of a teacher is reﬂected by the grades of students, but this might mo-
tivate the teacher to teach to the test or even alter the test scores. Monitoring the
teachers in order to detect this dysfunctional behavior might provide satisfactory
results, but this will increase the transaction cost. Finally, the parameters should
be measurable so that they can easily be quantiﬁed. Low data noise and high
consistency is also important for decreasing bias.
A summary of favorable properties:
• Employee or group speciﬁc
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• Mitigate eﬀect of uncontrollable risk
• Undistortable
• Measurable
• Low data noise and high consistency
2.3.2 Criteria for Techniques Estimating Performance
Techniques referes to systematic procedures to combine measures in order to
evaluate the overall performance of an employee or team, relative or absolute. In
order to evaluate the applicability of diﬀerent techniques, important criteria will
be established. These criteria are believed to be the key observations from chapter
2 and will be listed below with a short summary.
1. Attractive
A technique is considered attractive if it is easy and intuitive to implement.
High degree of transparency increases user acceptance. (Section 2.1.4)
2. Credibility
Credibility reﬂects how believable or trustworthy the technique is thought to
be. The degree of subjectivity and favoritism might introduce bias and aﬀect
the perception of fairness. A technique should also conform with production
theory and yield consistent measures. (section 2.1.4)
3. Balanced measurement
A technique should result in balanced measurement of employee performance.
Both for capturing all value adding actions and mitigate the multitasking
problem. (Sections 2.1.2 and 2.2.3)
4. Non-corruptible
Non-corruptible techniques are robust against dysfunctional responses and
other gaming responses. The technique should also distinguish controllable
and uncontrollable risk, and adjust for heterogeneity if this is present. (Sec-
tions 2.2.2 and 2.2.3)
5. Low transaction cost
Transaction cost is the sum of ex ante and ex post costs related to implement-
ing and sustaining the technique. This include time spent communicating
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the evaluation scheme and estimating the performance scores. (Section 2.2.4)
A technique satisfying all criteria is more likely to capture true performance and
will ease the implementation and stimulate user acceptance.
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Chapter 3
Common Practice in Incentive
Systems
In this chapter, the most common techniques for performance evaluation in incen-
tive systems are evaluated. These techniques were identiﬁed through examining
numerous articles regarding performance appraisal in incentive systems1, in addi-
tion to ﬁndings in a survey conducted by Nankervis and Compton (2006).
3.1 Subjective Performance Evaluation
Subjective performance evaluation is an evaluation technique where the overall
performance of an employee is subjectively assessed by a manager. This evaluation
often seeks to determine if a performance is under, at or over par, or in more
general terms: exceptional, satisfactory or unsatisfactory. To determine which
category a performance belongs to, explicit criteria and to what extent they should
be met are established. These criteria ease the rather complex evaluation and
serves as anchoring, which might be used for ordinal ranking of performances.
Behaviourally Anchored Rating Scales (BARS) is one commonly used evaluation
scheme which make use of this approach.
1Informal conversations with business representatives have also contributed to the identiﬁca-
tion of common practice.
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Examples of use
Subjective performance evaluation is often used when evaluating non-ﬁnancial and
not easily quantiﬁed performance. This performance evaluation scheme is there-
fore often used when setting grades, and for supplementing decision making when
promoting employees.
Pros and cons
Pure subjective evaluations can easily be biased and distorted. The halo eﬀect
is described as a cognitive bias whereby the perception of one trait is inﬂuenced
by the perception of another trait, supported by Thorndike (1920) in his empirical
research. This eﬀect leads to implicit personality theory (IPA) (Stricker et al.
1974), which concerns the general expectations that we build about a person after
we know something of their central traits. Subjective evaluation may also result
in a compression of rating and rewards, as the supervisors often are reluctant to
give poor ratings to subordinates (Prendergast and Topel 1993).
Subjective evaluations might on the other hand enable an evaluator to capture
characteristics that would otherwise be diﬃcult to account for. As organizations
often are complex, the performance of employees is often too complex to only be
accounted for by objective evaluations. Subjective evaluation might also adjust for
noisy and inaccurate data in contrast to pure objective and deterministic models.
A subjective evaluation is also rather intuitive to apply, although the technique
becomes complex when evaluating multiple tasks.
Use in incentive system
Subjective evaluation is a relatively intuitive and easy evaluation scheme to im-
plement. This yields high attractivity but at the same time low transparency as it
relies on non-quantiﬁed and highly subjective data. The agent will probably more
often than not argue that a score was unjust when receiving a low score, especially
if he does not observe the actions of other agents or receive a proper feedback.
The credibility of the technique will foremost rely on the expertise, devoutness
and objectivity of the principal, as supported by Albright and Levy (1995). Em-
pirical research has documented how the halo eﬀect introduce bias and show
that a principal's evaluation is highly corruptible2. In this evaluation scheme, the
agent has an incentive to spend eﬀort on ingratiating itself with the evaluator.
This dysfunctional response will lower the credibility of the evaluation scheme and
increase the transaction cost. The transaction cost will also increase with the level
2Other psychometric characteristics: leniency, interrater agreement and ratee discriminability.
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of complexity, number of tasks to balance and with increasing number of prin-
cipals collaborating in setting the score. One way to increase the transparency,
and in turn credibility, is provide feedback to the evaluated employee but this is a
trade-oﬀ to increased transaction costs.
If the evaluators manage to keep their independence and not be inﬂuenced by
factors such as the halo eﬀect, subjective performance evaluation might oﬀset
eﬀects related to uncontrollable risk. The evaluation might also oﬀset dysfunctional
responses, as the principal(s) might use their expertise to judge an outcome or
action against the true objective of the organization. Because we are able to
evaluate tasks that otherwise would be diﬃcult to quantify, subjective evaluation
might also provide a balanced measurement.
Subjective evaluation is preferable in complex organizations where the focus is
to evaluate performance on long-run measures and drivers instead of quantiﬁable
outcomes. In organizations with a high degree of quantiﬁable measures, subjective
performance evaluation might foremost be used in implicit contracting (Baker et al.
1993) and for reinforcing objective performance measures.
3.2 Key Performance Indicator (KPI)
KPIs are multiple quantitative or qualitative measures, used by organizations to
gauge or compare performance in terms of meeting their strategic and operational
goals. This is done by comparing against an internal or external target to give an
indication of performance. In order to assess the performance of an organization,
it is common to construct multiple KPIs, each measuring a particular activity.
For this reason KPIs goes by the term partial productivity measures. It seems
to be no established framework for selecting the appropriate KPIs, and the se-
lection is rather industry and ﬁrm speciﬁc. Common metrics are often expressed
in ratios (e.g. output per employee, Cycle time ratio), relative (e.g. mean time
to repair, average customer satisfaction) or absolute values (e.g. number of sold
units, EBITDA3).
Examples of use
Every organization reporting their ﬁnancial statement, quarterly or yearly, in order
to compare performance, use KPI. Most organizations use KPIs in a wider extent
3Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization.
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as well, but might call it by other names. KPI is therefore regarded as the most
common way to measure performance. For examples of KPI used in the construc-
tion and health care industry, I suggest reading articles by Cox and Ahrens (2003)
and Sheldon (1998). See appendix A for examples of KPIs at diﬀerent levels.
Pros and Cons
The main advantage with KPI is the ease of communication and implementation
through its simplistic and intuitive representation. A KPI seldom include more
than two diﬀerent metrics, so that the result is transparent and understandable.
KPIs are easy to calculate on a simple calculator, which make them reliable and
yield a high attractivity and credibility. The downside to this simplistic measure
is that it fails to provide a balanced measurement. As the organization become
more complex and the number of KPIs increase, the multitasking problem grows
increasingly. While KPIs capture each particular task in an excellent way, the
technique fail to assess the overall performance of an employee.
Use in Incentive Systems
If KPIs are to be used in a incentive system, incentives will be provided on the basis
of each KPI which might lead to gaming. For instance, in a pay for performance
scheme with the measures quality and quantity, an employee might put all his
eﬀort into reaching the benchmark for quality. This will result in no eﬀort spent
on meeting the demanded quantity, but the employee receives a bonus nevertheless.
The worker could be penalized by this dysfunctional response, but as soon as we
do so, we are indirectly placing weights on the diﬀerent KPIs which is not in the
nature of this technique. If we on the other hand had published a list, displaying
all KPIs, the agent would himself have an incentive to spread his eﬀort4. The
employee could then use the same level of eﬀort to look mediocre on most KPIs,
or choose to increase his eﬀort and perform better overall. KPIs are not suitable
to avoid gaming and to assess overall performance under tangible rewards, but
might be satisfactory when intangible rewards are used. If the calculated KPIs
are communicated to all employees, each employee will subjectively and perhaps
unknowingly place weights on the KPIs to ﬁnd his ranking. Employees who score
the highest on all KPIs are easily identiﬁed as the most successful, but those
who only outperform their peers on certain KPIs might be ranked diﬀerently as a
result of individual preferences5.
4Assuming that the employee cares about what the other employees might think of him.
5An employee who outperform others on a certain KPI is likely to rank himself the highest
as he might consider his ﬁeld of interest as the most important.
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KPIs yield high attractivity through high transparency and the ease of calculating
and communicating the measures. KPIs are free from subjectivity if quantiﬁable
data exist and are credible as they conform to production theory. The transaction
cost is low, as KPIs are usually easy to estimate and the costs related to imple-
mentation and sustaining the technique is low. However, KPIs fail to provide a
balanced measure and assessment of the overall performance of an employee, and
are corruptible as they are absolute measures and do not adjust for risk and het-
erogeneity. By creating a composite measure of multiple KPIs, we will on the other
hand achieve a more balanced measure and mitigate the multitasking problem.
3.3 Balanced Scorecard and Composite Measure-
ments
Balance Scorecard (BSC) was introduced in 1992 by Kaplan and David, and came
as a solution to how companies could improve their management of their intangible
assets. The original thought was to use ﬁnancial metrics as the ultimate measures
for company success, and supplement with the three additional perspectives: cus-
tomer, internal process and learning and growth. This thought was inspired by
Lewis (1955) who based divisional performance on one ﬁnancial and seven non-
ﬁnancial metrics. Balance Scorecard did not provide any new insight on balancing
measurements, but served as a framework that put everything together. In this
thesis we will think of Balance Scorecard as a framework for including all rele-
vant KPIs in a composite measure, and that other similar methods for overall
assessment are deviations from this framework.
In order to express employee performance as one single score, we have to create
composite measurements through explicit weighting. The weights placed on each
single measure ought to reﬂect the relative importance of that measure. Put in
other words, the greater the importance, the greater the weight. Determining
the optimal weights is perhaps the most diﬃcult task after selecting appropriate
measures or parameters, and is often carried out by subjective evaluations. The
weights can also be determined by the Delphi method (Dalkey and Helmer 1963),
in order to reach group consensus. The ﬁnal score then becomes the summed
product of all KPIs and their relative weight. The weights placed on each measure
can either be ﬁxed or ﬂexible. Fixed weighting is often used in formula-based
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plans, where the weighting is held constant under the ﬁnal performance evaluation.
Flexible weighting allows the weights to be adjusted when calculating the ﬁnal
performance score, which increases the subjectivity. In an excellent article by
Ittner et al. (2003), the authors treat how weighting of diﬀerent kind of measures
should be conducted. In the same article, the authors also evaluate the use of
ﬂexible weighting in a Balanced Scorecard based incentive system.
Examples of Use
Balanced Scorecard is perhaps the most popular framework for assessing overall
performance of an employee or to aid decision making when multiple aspects are
treated. In 12 annual surveys (1996-2008) conducted by Bain & Company with
9,933 respondents from more than 70 countries, they report the total usage and
overall satisfaction of Balanced Scorecard:
Figure 3.1: Total usage and overall satisfaction of Balanced Scorecard (Bain & Company;
2011)
Pros and Cons
The Balanced Scorecard coupled with composite measurements manage to balance
ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial metrics, short run and long run. When the weights are
ﬁxed, this approach yields an intuitive and transparent representation of perfor-
mance which is easy to communicate to its users. The score is easy to calculate
when the weights are ﬁxed and the framework is widely accepted for balancing mul-
tiple measures. The downside of this approach is the subjective method for placing
weights, which require great skill and experience. Mispeciﬁed weights might be
adjusted by ﬂexible weighting.
Use in Incentive Systems
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Balanced scorecard ensures that eﬀort is spread out on tasks incorporated in the
scorecard by placing weights on ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial metrics. The balanced
measurements yield an overall assessment of performance evaluation, which mit-
igate dysfunctional responses. To determine whether or not an employee should
receive an incentive for his performance, his score must be compared against a set
(absolute) benchmark or relative to other employees.
The speciﬁcation of weights is the most diﬃcult task after selecting appropriate
measures, and in a real world application agents have incentives to lobbying about
the weights. Agents might criticize the selection of weights as they seek to max-
imize the weight on the task which they perform the best. The use of ﬂexible
weights might adjust for uncontrollable risk, but will at the same time increase
subjectivity and might lead to favoritism and bias. In fact, in a paper by Kaplan
et al. (2007), based on empirical research, the author notes that subordinate lik-
ability inﬂuences evaluators' judgments even when the performance measurement
instrument is structured using the BSC [p. 107].
Even though BSC initially yields high attractivity, the extended use of subjective
evaluations lower its transparency and attractivity. In a paper by Ittner et al.
(2003) the authors conducts a survey amongst 572 North American managers,
and ﬁnd that 14,7% of the respondents consider BSC as a black box. In terms
of credibility Ittner et al. found that 12 % felt that favoritism and bias came
too much in play in BSC. While composite measures are less corruptible than
KPIs, as they mitigate the multitasking problem by balancing multiple parameters,
the subjective weighting seems suboptimal. Composite measures and BSC score
average on transaction cost, as the speciﬁcation of weights is likely to initiate
time-consuming discussions.
3.4 Summary of Common Practice
Balanced Scorecard seems to be more suitable than KPIs in most cases, as the
methodical framework seeks a balanced performance evaluation. BCS is also less
corruptible than KPIs as KPIs are unable to cope with the multitasking problem.
Balanced Scorecard and composite measures are also more suitable than subjec-
tive evaluations if all important parameters are measurable and if we seek a pure
deterministic method. Balanced Scorecard has on the other hand been criticized
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for its rather subjective methodology for placing weights on the parameters and
might be diﬃcult to incorporate in complex organizations. Subjective evaluations
might be more appropriate in complex environmnets, as a performance evaluation
solely based on objective measures is likely to be incomplete. Subjective evalua-
tions are also more suitable for oﬀsetting bias related to measurement errors and
gaming as ex post evaluations may be used to identify dysfunctional responses.
A short summary is displayed in table 3.4, ranking each techniques fulﬁllment of
the criteria in section 2.3.2. The asterisk indicates that a score is highly dependent
on the principal, while the respective score is thought to be the most likely.
Atr. Cred. Balanced Non-corruptible Transaction cost
Subjective 2 2* 3* 2* 1
KPI 3 2* 1 1 3
BCS, CM 3 2* 3 2 2
Table 3.1: The higher score (3-1), the better. * Relies on the principal
Productivity and technical eﬃciency are little exploited as performance evaluation
techniques in incentive systems. Empirical applications seem to be lacking and
only a few articles have been found with a direct link between technical eﬃciency
and incentive systems. This is quite surprising giving the fact that the literature on
technical eﬃciency and productivity is extensive and well-established in the ﬁeld of
operations research. One might wonder why these techniques are so little exploited
in performance evaluation under strategic behavior, and if technical eﬃciency and
productivity are unsuitable or simply neglected.
The remaining chapters of this thesis will therefore be designated an explicit eval-
uation of the potential for using productivity and technical eﬃciency as techniques
for evaluating performance in incentive systems. To my knowledge, no previous
work has been done on providing a simultaneous evaluation of diﬀerent techniques
for evaluating the performance of agents.
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Chapter 4
Technical Eﬃciency and
Productivity
4.1 Theoretical Introduction To Eﬃciency and
Productivity
Section 4.1 will be devoted to a theoretical introduction to technical eﬃciency and
productivity as the techniques are somewhat intertwined. The introduction will
provide a basis for treating technical eﬃciency and productivity in detail in section
4.3 and 4.4. When covering productivity and technical eﬃciency, I will adapt the
set representation following the notation of Färe and Primont (1995), apart from
substituting q for y. This provides a compact and consistent formulation and will
be applied for all techniques.
Performance evaluation related to productivity and technical eﬃciency are rooted
in production theory, in which we consider decision making units (DMUs) as en-
tities transforming inputs into outputs. A DMU's input-output vector is denoted
production mix, while all DMUs under evaluation can be represented by the tech-
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nology set, also named production possibility set:
S = { (x, y) : x can produce y }
where
x :n ∗ 1 input vector of non-negative real numbers
y :m ∗ 1 output vector of non-negative real numbers
This set contains all feasible input-output vectors representing the underlying tech-
nology for a given period. We may equivalently deﬁne the technology by the output
set, P (x), denoting all output vectors technological feasible using input vector x:
P (x) = { y : (x, y) ∈ S }
or input set L(y):
L(y) = { x : (x, y) ∈ S }
The input and output sets are assumed to satisfy certain axioms, such as the
property of convexity1.
4.1.1 Distance Functions
The output set P (x) is a basis for constructing a production possibility frontier
(PPF), representing various combinations feasible at a given input level. The input
counterpart to the PPF is the isoquant. If we assume that one input, x1, is needed
to produce two outputs, y1 and y2, we can construct a two dimensional PPF. This
construct is depicted in ﬁgure (4.1), which also illustrate the eﬀect of technical
change by an outward shift of the PPF. As we can see from this ﬁgure, the new
technology will able us to produce a higher level of outputs for the same level of
input. The outward shift of the blue PPF depicted in ﬁgure (4.1) is named neutral
technical change, as the ratio of y1 and y2 is unchanged. The red PPF is a non-
neutral technical change which skew the curve, so that the marginal production
rate of one of the goods has increased relative to the other.
The construction of a PPF gives us the foundation for describing output and
input distance functions. The two latter terms were introduced independently by
1See Battese et al. (2005) for a full summary.
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Figure 4.1: PPFNt depicts a neutral technical change, while PPF
NN
t depicts non-neutral
technical change. PPFs is PPF for base period, s.
Malmquist (1953) and Shephard (1953), which enable a description of a multi-
input or multi-output production technology without specifying any behavioral
objective (maximize proﬁt or minimize cost). The output distance function is
deﬁned on the output set, P (x) as:
do(x, y) = inf
σ
{ σ : (y/σ) ∈ P (x) } (4.1)
where σ is a scalar denoting the minimal radial expansion of the output vector to
reach the frontier. Likewise, the input distance function is given in equation 4.2,
ρ being the maximal radial contraction of x to reach the frontier.
di(x, y) = sup
ρ
{ ρ : (x/ρ) ∈ L(y) } (4.2)
Under constant returns to scale it holds that do(x, y) = [di(x, y)]
−1
.
The distance functions will be used for deﬁning index numbers and to introduce
technical eﬃciency. For further treatment and discussion of distance functions, the
reader is advised to read articles by Färe and Primont (1995) and Russell (1998).
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4.1.2 Technical And Allocative Eﬃciency
Based on the input distance function assuming constant returns-to-scale (crs), I
will introduce the work of Farrell (1957). Based on the contribution from Debreu
(1951) and Koopmans (1951), Farrell established the foundation for studies of
eﬃciency and productivity on a micro-level. Farrell described economic eﬃciency
as a combination of two measures: Technical eﬃciency and allocative eﬃciency.
The ﬁrst term measure a ﬁrm's ability to maximize output at a given input level,
while allocative eﬃciency reﬂects the optimal input-mix which minimize the costs
of an eﬃcient production. This is depicted in picture 4.2. In ﬁgure 4.2, the curve Y
X1
X2
P
Q
S
R
Y=f(x  , x  )1 2
0
A
A‘
Figure 4.2: Technical and allocative eﬃciency
represent the isoquant where two inputs, x1 and x2 are consumed (Y = f(x1, x2)),
alternatively deﬁned by a distance function isoq(y) = {x : di(x, y) = 1}. The point
P refer to one observed DMU producing one unit, which could reduce its inputs
and still reach the isoquant. The ratio between used inputs (OP ) and optimal
input mix (OR) gives a measurement for technical eﬃciency (TE = OR/OP ) or
deﬁned using distance functions: TE = 1di(x,y) = do(x, y). By this, we can see that
distance functions are reciprocals of Farrell's eﬃciency measure.
If we have information on input prices, we might also be able to deﬁne allocative
eﬃciency. In ﬁgure 4.2 the line AA′ being a tangent to Y in point Q represent the
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isocost curve, so that Q is the point where the price of the input mix is minimized.
Allocative eﬃciency (AE) then become OS/OR.
This leads us to the ﬁnal overall cost eﬃciency (CE), deﬁned as:
OR
OP
∗ OS
OR
=
OS
OP
We have now seen how the output distance functions are used for describing techni-
cal eﬃciency as the distance to the isoquant. The importance of technical eﬃciency
will be stressed in chapter 4.3, but we have to be aware of a few important issues
related to eﬃciency. As we will see in the next section, two ﬁrms A and B might
both be technical eﬃcient, but B still have a higher productivity ( yx ) than A.
4.1.3 Decomposition of Total Factor Productivity
When we consider productivity change it is common to use total factor productivity
(TFP). TFP is often decomposed into sources of productivity change, where each
component has its distinct eﬀect and causes.
For now, we have focused on ﬁrms operating under a global crs production tech-
nology, implying that all ﬁrms are automatically scale eﬃcient. If the underlying
production theory on the other hand is variable returns-to-scale (vrs), a ﬁrm might
be too small or too large in its scale so that it operates at an increasing returns-
to-scale (irs) or decreasing returns-to-scale (drs) respectively. This is depicted in
ﬁgure (4.3) for a one output, two input vrs production technology as given in
(Battese et al. 2005; page 59). By becoming scale eﬃcient a ﬁrm will be able to
increase its productivity and the problem of operating at the technically optimal
productive scale (TOPS) is given as:
TOPS = max { y/x|(x, y) ∈ S } (4.3)
This can be described as ﬁnding the feasible production point that maximizes pro-
ductivity, illustrated in ﬁgure (4.4). Apart from improving productivity through
scale eﬃciency change (SEC), decompositions into technical change (TC) and
technical eﬃciency change (TEC) are well-established in the literature. Tech-
nical change (TC) is a result of change in production technology, measured as the
change in ability to produce a level of outputs with a given input vector in period
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C
Figure 4.3: All ﬁrms are TE, but the rays from the origin show diﬀerences in productivity
given as the slope y/x. This inconsistency is due to the eﬀects of scale. A is operating at
irs, C at drs and B is operating at TOPS.
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Figure 4.4: D can become eﬃcient and increase productivity by moving to E. P is a
feasible production point and is more productive, but as eﬃcient as E.
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t in comparison to levels feasible in period s (see ﬁgure 4.1):
TCs,to =
dto(x, y)
dso(x, y)
(4.4)
TC is equivalently the change in feasible input levels with a given output level.
Positive TC is either illustrated by an expansion of the PPF-curve or contraction
of the isoquant.
Technical eﬃciency change (TEC) is given by how much an observed output or
input vector can be radially expanded to reach the frontier of the production
possibility set:
TECs,to (xt, yt, xs, ys) =
dto(xt, yt)
dso(xs, ys)
(4.5)
In his paper Scale Eﬃciency and Productivity Change, Balk (2001) introduced
yet another source for productivity change, named the output mix eﬀect (OME)
or equivalently input mix eﬀect (IME). These two eﬀects measure how changes in
the composition of the input or output-vector eﬀects scale eﬃciency. A general
measure of OME can be deﬁned for a technology in a given period (e.g. t) and
input or output vector:
OMEt(x, ys, yt) =
SEto(x, yt)
SEto(x, ys)
(4.6)
In other words, OME capture the eﬀect on scale eﬃciency when moving from
output vector ys to yt. Note that OME = 1 under CRS. This eﬀect is on the
other hand not well established in the literature and is less intuitive than the
other sources of TFP change.
When we combine all factors the decomposition of TFP change become:
TFP Change = TC ∗ TEC ∗ SEC ∗OME (4.7)
While the decomposition of TFP change is an important topic when assessing the
sources of productivity change, it might be less relevant in case of assessing the
overall performance of an employee for determining rewards. The decomposition of
TFP change might give us an idea of why an employee has become more productive,
thus being potential important in sake of adopting best practice. In the case of
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providing rewards we are on the other hand not interested in why an employee
has become more productive, apart from revealing gaming or risk, but rather
measuring the extent of change in productivity. Although, in some industries
an increase or decrease in scale eﬃciency might result in lower proﬁts and make
the ﬁrm worse oﬀ. The most important lesson from the decomposition of TFP
change, hereinafter productivity change, is that technical eﬃciency is a component
of productivity change, and that the terms should not be used interchangeably. In
the following we will focus on how measures of technical eﬃciency and productivity
change might aﬀect how agents behave under performance evaluation in incentive
systems.
4.2 Eﬃciency and Productivity in Incentive Sys-
tems
Assume that we regard employees as DMUs, who carry out processes transforming
input(s) into output(s), tangible or intangible. If we had knew the most eﬃcient
production mixes (underlying technology), the performance of an employee could
be measured by the distance to the eﬃcient frontier, receiving an eﬃciency score
from 0 to 100 %. However, in most cases we do not know the underlying technol-
ogy and must compare against an empirical estimated frontier. The most eﬃcient
DMUs in the reference technology set will construct this frontier, and the perfor-
mance of a DMU is measured relative to other DMUs and/or established bench-
mark(s). For now the technical details on estimating this frontier are omitted, but
will be the main focus in section 4.3. When measuring productivity change, we
can do so against a set benchmark, relative to other DMUs or relative to the DMU
under evaluation in another period. The technical details for estimating produc-
tivity change will be treated in section 4.4. and for now the focus is directed at
the fundamental diﬀerences between measuring productivity and eﬃciency. In the
following an evaluation on how the choice between technical eﬃciency ﬁxed in time
and productivity change might aﬀect the outcome and behavior of agents.
When conceptualizing the diﬀerence between measuring eﬃciency and productiv-
ity a hypothetical ﬁrm with multiple plants will be utilized. These plants are
producing identical products but at diﬀerent geographical locations and to diﬀer-
ent markets. These plants will be subjected to diﬀerences in market ﬂuctuations
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and organizational culture, giving birth to heterogeneity and environmental diﬀer-
ences. In this ﬁrm, the CEO is considered being the principal delegating decision
making authority to plant managers who are considered agents. In order to lower
the ex ante transaction costs, the CEO has decided to incorporate the same perfor-
mance evaluation scheme of plant managers at all plants. Output is total revenue
(products are sold locally at the plant), while inputs are man-hours, operating
costs (deducted for wages) and investments in tangible assets2. In the following,
extrinsic rewards are limit to performance based pay.
4.2.1 Technical eﬃciency
When measuring technical eﬃciency DMUs are compared against an eﬃcient fron-
tier. For this comparison to be valid, the units under investigation must be able
to reach the frontier, in other words, not be limited by a diﬀerent technology than
the one they are measured against. When comparing against a frontier, we have
two distinct frontier cases: 1) The most eﬃcient plants determine the frontier
(relative), 2) the plants are compared against a known frontier (absolute).
If two plants, Alfa and Bravo, are producing the same good but Alfa uses a capital
intensive technology while Bravo uses a labor intensive technology, they will not
follow the same production function. If we on the other hand introduce a third
plant, Charlie, identical to Bravo but with a more skilled and motivated work-
force, heterogeneity might be less observable to the principal. In this case Charlie
will most probably be more eﬃcient than Bravo, thus the production manager at
Charlie will receive a higher performance score than the manager at Bravo.
If we follow frontier case 1, Charlie will establish the frontier and become technical
eﬃcient. If Charlie always turn out to be eﬃcient, the plant manager will only
have weak incentives to increase his eﬀorts as he always receive a reward. Only
plant manager at Bravo have a strong incentive to increase his eﬀort, although he
might chose to not participate in the incentive system if he never receives a bonus.
Weak incentives might be oﬀset by limiting the total amount of performance pay,
so that the entire budget for bonus payments is split amongst the players. The
better plant Charlie operates, the worse plant Bravo will look and plant manager
at Charlie captures more of the incentive pay.
2These are perhaps not the most useful inputs, but are selected for illustrative purposes.
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Technical eﬃciency used as a performance evaluation scheme is desirable for an
eﬃcient manager, although it might only give weak incentives for increasing eﬀort.
The ineﬃcient manager will on the other hand always have a strong incentive to
increase its eﬀort, but he might be limited by environmental factors. Therefore,
technical eﬃciency violates the credibility criterion if a plant manager operates in
a more diﬃcult environment and the performance evaluation will seem unjust.
If we calculate eﬃciency against a known production frontier (frontier case 2)
with deterministic data, the evaluation become absolute and will be unable to
capture shocks. In this case, the performance of an agent is not aﬀected by the
performance of another, and the strength of relative performance evaluation is lost.
At the same time, a pure deterministic model might induce the agent to blame the
environment if he is ineﬃcient, as a result of asymmetric information. Absolute
performance evaluation has the advantage that no employees receive a bonus if
everybody perform poorly, as opposed to relative evaluation where at least one
will be rewarded. For empirical estimated frontiers it might therefore be advisable
to include virtual units representing expected performances.
When measuring technical eﬃciency, we do so for a deﬁned period. This period
might consist of a single measurement point or aggregated data for several points.
Either way, technical eﬃciency measures are status quo and do not tell us anything
about the development in performance. Such temporal performance measures are
inadequate to measure trends and thus lacks the ability to measure whether the
organization has improved from one period to another. Temporal comparisons
also lack the ability to capture the eﬀect of price changes and comparability due
to changes in production.
4.2.2 Productivity change
When using productivity change in performance evaluations, we measure the pro-
ductivity of current period against the productivity in a base period. Again con-
sider the plant managers at Bravo and Charlie, where manager at Charlie was
the most eﬃcient in the previous period. The CEO has decided to incorporate
a scheme measuring productivity change from previous period and is indiﬀerent
whether the cause is change in scale eﬃciency or technical eﬃciency.
We remember from section 2.1.3 that several factors might cause variability in
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panel data, where unsystematic and systematic inﬂuences of nature imposes a risk
on the agents. While unsystematic variability is diﬃcult to account for, systematic
ﬂuctuations should receive great attention when base year is selected as it might
aﬀect the calculation of productivity change. If the base year is selected when
nature has chosen favorable conditions, a plant manager might experience lower
productivity in later periods simply because environmental factors (uncontrollable
risk) have worsen. This might even be true for an agent who is not eﬀort averse and
who genuinely seeks to maximize the value of the organization. If the previous pe-
riod in our thought experiment was dominated by high demands and has decreased
for current period, the productivity at Bravo and Charlie is likely to decrease if the
plant managers were unable to adjust inputs proportionally. This would result in
a productivity score below 1, thus indicating a decline in productivity. If rewards
only would be provided to plants with a TFP change exceeding 1, it would be cruel
to omit seasonal market ﬂuctuations in the equation. By comparing periods with
similar characteristics, plant managers would always have an incentive to improve
their productivity. If the evaluation periods rather were dominated by unsystem-
atic ﬂuctuations, it would be a better strategy to provide rewards on the basis of
productivity change relative to other plants. Relative productivity change might
be the best evaluation scheme during recessions. Another observation about base
periods, is that they may become obsolete, as strategic choices and technologies
are likely to change in time.
Productivity change as a performance evaluation always gives a strong incentive
to increase evaluated performance, but state of nature give rise to moral haz-
ard and adverse selection. Productivity change is therefore foremost a desirable
framework if the market is stable, or when the principal and agent share the same
information about the state of nature. But should increased productivity result
in a bonus? Let's assume that plant Bravo and Charlie have identical production
environments, but the manager at Bravo has invested a higher level of eﬀort than
manager at Charlie over the past years. When introducing productivity change
as performance evaluation, the most eﬀort averse plant manager is likely to have
greater possibilities for improvement, assuming they have the same potential. If
this is true, the manager at Charlie will receive the best performance score, thus
contradicting the credibility criterion. Nevertheless, the objective of a incentive
scheme is to increase the eﬀort spent on value adding actions, thus rewarding
bonuses to those who improve the most seems like a good strategy afterall.
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4.2.3 Summary and comparisons
Before giving a simultaneous evaluation of technical eﬃciency and productivity in
incentive systems, a summary of the ﬁndings so far will be given.
Technical Eﬃciency
• Eﬃcient plant managers have weak incentives to improve
• Ineﬃcient plant managers have strong incentives to improve
• In homogeneous environment, the best manager is likely to receive strongest
incentives
• In heterogeneous environments, theoretically the worst manager might re-
ceive strongest incentives
• Temporal comparisons
Productivity Change
• Strong incentive to increase evaluated performance (unless private and per-
fect information about state of nature)
• Selection of base year increase complexity and might lead to gaming re-
sponses
• A base period might become obsolete in time
• Do not necessarily provide incentives to the most eﬃcient plant manager
• Dynamic comparisons
It was noted that plant manager at Bravo would receive a lower eﬃciency score
than manager at Charlie due to heterogeneity, thus being unjust as a performance
evaluation. By adapting an evaluation scheme based on productivity change, the
managers will be compared against themselves so that possible eﬀects of hetero-
geneity diminishes. This would also provide a strong incentive to improve for
the eﬃcient manager, unless he has private information about market ﬂuctuations
which might give rise to moral hazard. But how may decision-making amongst
plant managers be aﬀected by the choice of evaluation scheme? If the eﬃcient
plant manager at Charlie had a choice whether to invest in a capital intensive
technology or remain labour intensive, he could be reluctant to do so if he was
assessed by TE. This is because he would then be evaluated against manager at
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Alfa, who most likely would be more eﬃcient due to superior expertise. Since
the dominated strategy would be to not invest, the CEO would have to compen-
sate the agent for investing in machines if this was desirable. If he rather was
evaluated by productivity change, the manager would be more likely to invest in
machines. Charlie should still be evaluated against Alfa, as plants with capital
intensive technologies are more are likely to experience higher start up costs as
well as low productivity under low demands. Let's also assume that the CEO was
searching for a new manager at plant Charlie and Bravo and that a candidate
was considering which job opening to apply for. If the evaluation scheme utilized
technical eﬃciency, the applicant would apply for plant Charlie if he had knowlede
about the diﬀerences between the workforces. By basing the evaluation scheme on
productivity change, he would on the other hand be less reluctant to apply for the
opening at Bravo.
Productivity might, opposed to measures of eﬃciency, detect and adjust for hetero-
geneous environments if the state of nature is somewhat ﬁxed through time. Under
both techniques we see how controllable and uncontrollable risk might distort the
measures, and that environmental factors should be accounted for explicitly. Note
that this is true for both KPI and composite measures as well. The perhaps most
important observation is that technical eﬃciency is a static measurement, while
productivity is dynamic. As treated in section 2.1.3, a high productivity is often
more satisfactory than a high eﬃciency when evaluating how organizations evolve.
Technical eﬃciency is important for evaluating present state of performance so
that managers might detect e.g. best 25% and worst 25% performers. Technical
eﬃciency and productivity change have diﬀerent applicabilities and should be re-
garded as complements, as they tell diﬀerent tales about the performance of an
employee.
4.3 Technical Eﬃciency Estimation
Technical eﬃciency was introduced in section 4.1.2 through Farrell's isoquant di-
agram, which can equally be derived through distance functions. Estimating TE
is diﬃcult in practice as we do not know the shape of the isoquant, or similarly
the production function. In order to estimate a production function, Farrell con-
structed a scatter plot of the input mixes for diﬀerent DMUs, each producing one
unit. Assuming that it was possible to deﬁne new DMUs through convex com-
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binations of observed homogeneous3 units, Farrell then constructed the empirical
production possibility frontier (depicted in ﬁgure 4.5).
X1
X2
s’
s
Figure 4.5: Farrell's estimation of the empirical PPF
The four DMUs on the frontier are all technical eﬃcient by the deﬁnition of Pareto-
optimality (Warburton 1983), while the other ﬁrms ineﬃciency are given by their
distance to the frontier.
Farrells method for deriving the PPF is fundamental for several empirical estima-
tion techniques, and in this thesis I will cover the most used techniques, Stochastic
Frontier Analysis (SFA) and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).
4.3.1 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
DEA is a non-parametric and deterministic technique for estimating the production
function. The ﬁrst DEA-model was developed by Charnes et al. (1978), also known
as the CCR-model. The purpose of the technique was to calculate the relative
eﬃciency of a DMU through a fractional linear programming formulation on the
3Producing the same kind of products with identical inputs under similar conditions.
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form:
maximize
∑s
r=1 uryr0∑m
i=1 vixi0
(4.8a)
s.t.∑s
r=1 uryrj∑m
i=1 vixij
≤ 1 ∀j ∈ I (4.8b)
ur, vi ≥ 0 ∀r, i (4.8c)
where
n : number of DMUs
s : number of outputs
m : number of inputs
yrj : output r for DMU j
xij : input i for DMU j
ur : weight on output r
vi : weight on input i
DMUk : DMU to be evaluated
I : reference set with all units
When estimating the eﬃciency for the DMUs, the objective function is calculated
for one unit at a time (DMUk). The objective function (4.8a) maximizes the
fraction of weighted sum of outputs over the weighted sum of inputs, with the
weights as decision variables. For each optimization problem, constraint (4.8b)
ensure that no unit in I achieve more than 100% eﬃciency (objective function
is equal 1), while (4.8c) ensure non-negative weights. If one of the DMUs in I
achieve an eﬃciency score of 1 with the optimal weights of DMU0, the DMU
under evaluation cannot be eﬃcient unless DMU0 is a scaled version of one of the
units in I. It is worth mentioning that a DMU might have several sets of optimal
weights for the same eﬃciency score.
By performing a linear transformation of formulation (4.8), the problem of estimat-
ing eﬃciencies can be formulated as a set of n linear programs (LP). The distance to
the eﬃcient frontier can either be measured as a proportional reduction in input-
usage or proportional increase in outputs. These are denoted input-oriented or
45
output-oriented models respectively, and should be selected on the basis of which
orientation the DMUs have the most control over. E.g., if outputs are more or less
ﬁxed by certain demands one should adopt the input orientation.
When performing a linear transformation of formulation (4.8) and assume that the
DMUs is capable of reducing their inputs, the CCR-model is transformed on the
form:
max
s∑
r=1
uryr0 (4.9a)
s.t.
s∑
r=1
uryr0 −
m∑
i=1
vixi0 ≤ 0 ∀j (4.9b)
m∑
i=1
vixi0 = 1 (4.9c)
ur, vi ≥ 0, ∀r, i (4.9d)
This formulation is the CCR-model on multiplier form, which can be transformed
to the envelopment form by taking its dual:
θ∗ = min θ (4.10a)
s.t.
n∑
j=1
λjxij ≤ θxi0 ∀i (4.10b)
n∑
j=1
λjyrj ≥ yr0 ∀r (4.10c)
λj ≥ 0, ∀n (4.10d)
The objective function (4.10) calculates the eﬃciencies of DMUs by assuming that
all units are operating at an optimal scale, thus measuring TE that are confounded
by scale eﬃciencies (Charnes et al. 1985). The introduced dual variables consist
of one 1 ∗ n vector λ and a scalar θ. A DMU is deﬁned as eﬃcient if θ = 1, while
being increasingly ineﬃcient as θ approach zero. For an ineﬃcient DMU, θ is the
minimum radial reduction of inputs to become eﬃcient.
The λ-vector contain the convex combination of DMUs constructing the local
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eﬃcient frontier for an ineﬃcient DMU. If we go back to ﬁgure 4.5 and draw
a straight line from the origin to the evaluated DMU, the line will be the radial
contraction path for its inputs. The units that constructs the convex local frontier,
which is intersected by the contraction path, constitutes the eﬃcient reference
DMUs.
Because units may not operate at optimal scales, Banker et al. (1984) seeked to
separate scale eﬃciencies and TE. This was accomplished by adding the restriction∑n
j λj = 1 to equation (4.9), resulting in the BCC-model assuming variable returns
to scale (VRS):
max
s∑
r=1
uryr0 + u0 (4.11a)
mhp
s∑
r=1
uryr0 −
m∑
i=1
vixi0 + u0 ≤ 0 ∀j (4.11b)
m∑
i=1
vixi0 = 1 (4.11c)
ur, vi ≥ 0, u0 free , ∀r, i (4.11d)
While CCR deﬁne a linear front BCC deﬁne a piece-wise linear front of non-
dominated units, as we can see in ﬁgure (4.6).
Under CCR, the eﬃciency of DMUB is calculated as
MN
MB , while BCC eﬃciencies
are calculated as MOMB . From this we can derive scale eﬃciency as the eﬃciency
score under CCR over the eﬃciency score under BCC. From this follows that the
eﬃciency scores calculated under BCC will be equal or higher than eﬃciency scores
derived from CCR. In addition, we will expect BCC to identify more eﬃcient
DMUs than CCR (DMUA is deﬁned eﬃcient under BCC, but not CCR), while
all CCR-eﬃcient DMUs will automatically be BCC-eﬃcient (DMUC). BCC and
CCR make a priori assumptions about the global returns to scale (grs) for the
technology, but in cases where the choice of grs is not obvious one should adopt
the two-stage hypothesis approach proposed by Eopold Simar and Wilson (2002).
In empirical applications it is most common to report eﬃciency scores from both
BCC and CCR models, enabling us to determine whether eﬃciencies are scale size
dependent. In the DEA-literature, a great deal of attention has also been brought
to the determination of whether a DMU operates at a locally crs, drs or irs. Three
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Figure 4.6: CCR deﬁne a linear front, while BCC deﬁne a piece-wise linear front.
basic methods are summarized in an article by Seiford and Zhu (1999), but all have
in common that they evaluate the sum of λs for each DMU. In short, if the sum
of λ is constant in any alternate optima,
∑n
j=1 λ∗ = 1 :crs,
∑n
j=1 λ∗ > 1:drs and∑n
j=1 λ∗ < 1 : irs. A last theoretical observation on the diﬀerence between the
BCC and CCR model is that the choice of orientation does not aﬀect the eﬃciency
scores for CCR. Under BCC on the other hand, the input and output-orientation
will not yield identical eﬃciency scores for ineﬃcient units, but as Battese et al.
(2005)[p. 181] note: ...output - and input orientated DEA models will estimate
exactly the same frontier and therefore, by deﬁnition, identify the same set of ﬁrms
as being eﬃcient..
DEA is under continuous methodological development, where extensions and new
approaches facilitates the use of DEA in increasingly complex problems and new
applications. In a recent paper by Cook and Seiford (2009), the authors summa-
rizes the development of DEA over the past 30 years, which also might serve as an
additional introduction on the topic.
Examples of use
DEA is under continuously development and has been applied on a large variety of
applications across diﬀerent organizations and industries. It has become common
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practice for evaluating performance in health care (Huang and McLaughlin 1989,
Parkin and Hollingsworth 1997) and schools (Alexander et al. 2007, Coelli 1996),
to mention a few applications. DEA was also used by Barr et al. (1991) for an
early identiﬁcation of troubled banks, with high accuracy. By adding units from
other periods to the reference set, DEA has been used in trend studies where
technical eﬃciency is compared between periods. This goes by the term window
analysis in the DEA-literature and it is often common to use a rolling window of
three periods (Charnes et al. 1984; example). DEA might also be used for cost
minimization and revenue or proﬁt maximization when input and output prices
are available.
Pros and cons
DEA is superior in its ability of simultaneously handling multiple inputs and mul-
tiple outputs and ease of formulating. Because DEA is non-parametric, we do not
have to make any a priori assumptions about the shape of the frontier. This yields
great ﬂexibility, but free weighting of parameters might be undesirable because
a DMU will under-emphasize weak performances and overemphasize on strong
performances. This can be resolved by setting an explicit interval for the rela-
tive weights to be placed on each parameter by adding constraints to the linear
optimization problem on multiplier form. This method goes by the name assur-
ance region (Dyson and Thanassoulis 1988), but the cone ratio method Kornbluth
(1991) is also a well established method. Assurance regions will ensure a balanced
evaluation of a DMU, conform with the criterion about a balanced measurement.
In order to implement an assurance region we simply add conditional constraints
to equation (4.9):
lb ≤ ui∑s
r=1 ur
≤ ub
resulting in two linear constraints: (4.12)
ui − lb
s∑
r=1
ur ≥ 0
ub
s∑
r=1
ur − ui ≥ 0
,where lb is lower bound and ub is upper bound on the relative weight u for param-
eter i. Alternatively we might apply ordinal ranking of the relative importance of
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each parameter. E.g. ui+2 ≥ ui ≥ ui+1:
ui − ui+1 ≥ 0
ui+2 − ui ≥ 0
Another issue is the increasing degree of freedom - increase in number of opti-
mal product mixes - as ratio of DMUs to parameters get low. This will make
more DMUs look eﬃcient and lower the discriminating power. To increase the
discriminating power, one might reduce the number of parameters by combining
and eliminate highly correlated variables or apply the super eﬃciency model. By
implementing the super eﬃciency model (Banker and Giﬀord 1988) DMUs can on
the other hand receive a score greater than 100%, thus increasing the discrimina-
tion power (see ﬁgure 4.7). Note that eﬃcient units are not indiﬀerent whether a
BCC or CCR-model is applied, as the super eﬃciency scores based on BCC and
CCR will diﬀer. Also note that super eﬃciency models might be infeasible as it
may not be possible to radially expand or contract a DMU to the frontier when
the evaluated DMU is removed from the reference set.
Output
Input
DEA
DEA
BCC
CCR
C
S
S
Figure 4.7: The ﬁgure depicts how the eﬃcient frontier is altered when DMUC is excluded
from the reference set. Super eﬃciency for DMUC may be estimated as the distance to
either DEAsBCC or DEA
s
CCR
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Most limitations of the standard DEA model might be overcome by extending the
model, but there are a few issues which are more diﬃcult to cope with. First, DEA
is a deterministic method and for this reason it will loose credibility when noisy
data and heterogeneous units are used. The dataset should therefore be of high
quality, which is important for the calculation of KPIs and composite measures as
well. Secondly, DEA might be perceived as a complex technique if one is unfamiliar
with optimization procedures and mathematical expressions. The most important
implementation issue is perhaps to gain user acceptance, so that the calculation
seem transparent and the results are credible. Finally, DEA might identify DMUs
as eﬃcient even though they might not be eﬃcient by the deﬁnition of Pareto-
Koopmans eﬃciency. DEA do not distinguish non-dominated DMUs from weakly
non-dominated DMUs, and both appear to be on the frontier even though the
last class of DMUs could reduce their inputs and still produce the same level of
outputs. Some practitioners adopt a multistage DEA model where output or input
slacks are captured, but other practitioners state that the importance of slacks are
overstated and view it as an artifact of DEA (Ferrier and Lovell 1990).
Use in incentive systems
Even though DEA has become common practice for performance measurement,
it seems to be less common in incentive systems. For one example on how DEA
might be incorporated in a incetive system, the reader is adviced to read an article
by Sexton et al. (1994), who used DEA for implementing a pupil transportation
funding process encouraging operational eﬃciency. Banker (1980) was the ﬁrst
to publish a paper on a game theoretic approach to measuring eﬃciency, which
lead way to applications for optimal contracting. In two papers by Bogetoft (1994,
1995) the author propose a solution to the incentive problem, formalized as a
contract design problem. While Bogetoft in his ﬁrst paper focused on cost minimal
implementation, he focuses on the problem of implementing desired production
plans in his second paper. Together with Bogetoft, Jørgen Tind and Per J. Agrell
(2000, 2002) are regarded to be the most active individuals in agency theory and
DEA to this date, although their focus is on incentive regulatory mechanisms and
not performance evaluation of groups or individuals.
When implementing a DEA-model for use in incentive systems, the principal have
a choice whether a CCR (crs) or BCC (vrs) model should be applied and whether
to select an input or output orientation. Employees who are eﬃcient under CCR
are automatically eﬃcient under BCC and are indiﬀerent about the choice of global
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returns to scale or orientation. Note that if we apply the super eﬃciency model or
the entire budget under performance pay is split amongst the employees, the eﬃ-
cient players are no longer indiﬀerent. To guide a principal to choose between the
global returns to scale, one may either adopt the two stage hypothesis or examine
the nature of the production environment. In the CCR model we believe that all
ﬁrms are scale eﬃcient and compare units with diﬀerent scale sizes. In practice,
factors that put constraints on input- or output quantities such as imperfect com-
petition, regulations and restrictions on ﬁnance might cause DMUs to operate at
sub-optimal scale sizes. Hence we should use the BCC model where such eﬀects
prevails, i.e. where employees have diﬀerent quantity constraints4.
When choosing between orientations, one option is to select the orientation for
which the manager has most control but we should also consider strategic choices.
When it comes to the eﬃciency of employees, the principal are more likely to
emphasize on increasing the outputs, especially if work-hours is the only input.
We might argue that decreasing work-hours might open up a new job position
or reduce overtime but traditionally, and particularly in many public jobs, an
employee is employed for a ﬁxed number of work-hours. Also, in order to increase
market share, a ﬁrm might be more focused on increasing production so that an
output orientation should be adopted. A ﬁrm should on the other hand adopt an
input-orientation if the focus is on resource minimization and lay-oﬀs.
The use of relative eﬃciency evaluation is both a strength and weakness for use in
incentive systems. As pointed out in section 2.2.2, the use of relative performance
evaluation might induce the agents to maximize their eﬀort. On the other hand,
when the number of parameters get high relatively compared to number of DMUs,
the discriminating power will diminish. In order to increase the discriminating
power, the principal should seek to reduce parameters or introduce virtual DMUs
which serve as standards or expectations. When virtual DMUs are constructed,
the principal should avoid constructing linear combinations and focus on gener-
ating possible corner points. By adapting the super-eﬃciency model proposed by
Andersen and Petersen (1993) we might allow units to achieve more than 100% eﬃ-
ciency, so that a ranking is made possible. This will also aid to eliminate unwanted
Nash-equilibrium, as employees always can improve their eﬃciency score. Super
eﬃciency models should be used with caution as it might encourage further spe-
cialization, resulting in dysfunctional responses and give rise to the multitasking
4The clusters in ﬁgure 4.6 witnesses of such restrictions.
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problem.
Perhaps the greatest advantage of DEA is that it is non-parametric, so that the
principal does not have to specify the weights. The speciﬁcation of weights is
perhaps the most diﬃcult part of assessing overall performance when composite
measures are used, and is a source to lobbying. When the weights are set math-
ematically by the maximization procedure, lobbying becomes nearly impossible
and an agent cannot rightfully complain about the weights placed on the diﬀerent
parameters. In fact, every employee will automatically be assigned a set of weights
that are most favorable to them. The use of assurance regions might invite to some
discussion, but to a far lesser extent. The use of dynamic weighting of parameters
seems more appealing than ﬁxed weights as diﬀerent employees possess diﬀerent
skills and expertise, so that an organization accept several ways to be eﬃcient.
Even though DEA has gained acceptance as a technique for evaluating performance
and for identifying best practice in the research literature, it has not been found
evidence of extensive use in incentive systems. DEA will most likely be regarded
as an unfamiliar technique and great eﬀort should be spent on communicating its
applicability and methodology. Some practitioners are likely to be overwhelmed
by the compact mathematical formulation, and DEA will at ﬁrst seem less intu-
itive than Balanced Scorecard. The technique might therefore be considered as a
black box, contradicting the transparency and attractivity criterion. If carefully
explained, the underlying objective of DEA should be easy to grasp if the technical
details are omitted and one communicate to the agents that the weights you are
assigned will make you look as good as possible compared to your peers.
The ex ante cost of communicating and implementing DEA increase overall trans-
action costs, but will increase user acceptance. In fact, DEA might be perceived
as a reliable technique which avoids favoritism through its optimization proce-
dure and objective weighting. DEA seems therefore promising as a technique for
assessing overall performance in an incentive system, as it limit the eﬀect of cor-
ruptible responses. Both by using relative performance evaluation, or semi-relative
by adding virtual DMUs, and through the limited interference of a principals sub-
jective evaluation.
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4.3.2 Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA)
The foundation for SFA was established by Aigner and Chu (1968), who assumed
that a production possibility frontier could be estimated through an underlying
functional form. This functional form was supposed to reﬂect the production
properties of the DMUs, and they assumed a Cobb-Douglas function on the form:
ln yi = β0 + β lnxi − ui i = 1, · · · , I (4.13)
where
I : Number of units
yi : output from unit i
xi : K*1 input-vector
β : K*1 vector with unknown parameters
ui : a non-negative stochastiv variable with assumed probability density function
From this formula, we can see that SFA estimate a PPF for a production mix with
one output an multiple inputs. This might be equally transformed to a single-input
multiple-output case by changing the sign of the ineﬃciency term u (ineﬃciency
increase the use of input). SFA might also be extended to a multiple input- output
case by using distance functions, but this calculation is not straightforward and
imposes several computational issues.
In order to estimate the unknown parameters Aigner and Chu took use of lin-
ear programming, alternatively quadratic programming if a linear functional form
is assumed, while Richmond (1974) took use of modiﬁed ordinary least squares
(MOLS)
A drawback with formulation (4.13) is that it neglects measurement error and other
statistical noise, so that the distance to the frontier is strictly due to technical in-
eﬃciency. For this reason Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van Den Broeck
(1977) introduced independently of each other a new stochastic variable vi, cap-
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turing noise with a positive or negative contribution:
ln yi = β0 + βlnxi + vi − ui i = 1, · · · , I (4.14a)
alternatively
yi = exp (β0 + βlnxi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
deterministic component
∗ exp (vi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
noise
∗ exp (−ui)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ineﬃciency
(4.14b)
The newly introduced variable enable an ineﬃcient unit to lie above the frontier
because the noise gives a positive contribution, exceeding the ineﬃciency (vi > ui).
This is illustrated in ﬁgure 4.8, where a deterministic Cobb-Douglas function with
decreasing returns to scale for one input is assumed. Figure 4.8 depicts two units,
Deterministic front
Output
Input
yA
yB
yB
yA
*
*
xA xB
A*
A
B*
B
Figure 4.8: qi : equation (4.14) and q
∗
i : equation (4.15)
A and B, represented on the graph by their reported production mix, while A*
and B* gives the production mix if the units had been technical eﬃcient:
ln y∗i = β0 + βlnxi + vi i = 1, · · · , I (4.15)
As both units are assumed to be technical eﬃcient, the deviation of A* and B*
from the deterministic frontier is a result of a positively contributing noise element
for A and negative element for B. In fact, B is more eﬃcient than A, as A is further
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away from the frontier.
In order to estimate the technical eﬃciency for a DMU, we calculate the observed
output over the corresponding output from formula (4.15). Or in other words, the
observed output level over the optimal output level with identical input vector:
TEi =
yi
y∗i
(4.16a)
=
exp (β0 + βlnxi) ∗ exp (vi) ∗ exp (−ui)
exp (β0 + βlnxi) ∗ exp (vi) (4.16b)
= exp (−ui) (4.16c)
To be able to calculate the stochastic variable, we have to assume a probability
density function for v and u. Aigner et al. assumed that the vis were independently
and identically distributed normal random variables with zero means and variances
σ2v , and that the vis were independently and identically distributed half-normal
random variables with scale parameter σ2u:
vi ∼ iidN
(
0, σ2v
)
ui ∼ iidN+
(
0, σ2u
)
By parameterizing the log-likelihood function of equation (4.14) and use σ2 =
σ2v + σ
2
u and λ
2 = σ2u/σ
2
v ≥ 0, they arrived the following equation:
lnL(y|β, σ, λ) = −I
2
ln
(
piσ2
2
)
+
I∑
i=1
ln Φ
(
−iλ
σ
)
− 1
2σ2
I∑
i=1
2i (4.17)
where  = vi − ui and Φ(x) is the cumulative distribution function for x.
Aigner et al. then estimated the parameters by maximizing the log-likelihood
function (4.17) through an iterative optimization procedure, as the equation is
not possible to solve analytically. The iterative optimization used OLS-estimation
to initialize the parameters β, σ and λ, and then a MLE-estimation to ﬁnalize
the determination of the parameters. This calculation is rather complex, and
practitioners often take use of the program Frontier v. 4.1 5. See appendix B for
example code.
Another frequently used method to estimate the parameters is Bayesian markov-
5Frontier v. 4.1 use MLE in an iterative Davidon-Fletcher-Powell Quasi-Newton process
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chain monte carlo (MCMC), introduced by Smith and Roberts (1993), van den
Broeck et al. (1994) and Koop (1994). This method take use of a Gibbs sampling
algorithm for generating parameters, which converge toward ﬁnal values after a
suﬃciently large number of iterations6. For a more thorough review of the tech-
niques, the reader is advised to read an article by Koop and Steel (2007) as well
as the mentioned articles above. For empirical applications, I strongly recommend
to use WinBUGS 1.47.
The most challenging task when implementing SFA is to choose an explicit func-
tional form of the production function. In the literature, Cobb-Douglas and the
translog function is often used, but linear and quadratic functional forms are also
common. Cobb-Douglas is often used as it exhibit convenient mathematical prop-
erties, such as ease of estimation and analyzation. At the same time the Cobb-
Douglas function yield constant elasticity for returns to scale and is therefore poor
for estimating the eﬃciency of DMUs with variable returns to scale. The translog
function is more ﬂexible, but need more observations to provide reliable estima-
tions (Kuenzle 2005). The task of identifying the best functional form is therefore
a diﬃcult task which was addressed in a work by Lau (1986) where he proposed
several conditions to be met:
1. Theoretical consistency
2. Domain of applicability
3. Flexibility
4. Computational facility
5. Factual conformity
For a full treatment of these conditions, the reader is advised to look up the article
cited above. It is worth mentioning that the ﬂexibility criterion is a trade oﬀ to an
increase in the degree of freedom. At the same time, ﬂexible production functions
might be inconsistent with economical theory of a monotonic and quasi-concave
production function (Feng and Serletis 2009).
Apart from choosing the functional form there are several probability density func-
tions (pdf) proposed for the ineﬃciency term. In addition to half-normal, the most
6Kim and Schmidt (2000) compare the two methods and ﬁnd that both are consistent.
7http://www.mrc-bsu.cam.ac.uk/bugs/winbugs/contents.shtml
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common are gamma- (Greene 1990), exponential (Meeusen and van Den Broeck
1977) and truncated-normal pdf's (Stevenson 1980).
Examples of use
SFA has been used for evaluating eﬃciency in many of the same applications as
DEA: health care (Rosko 2001), schools (Stevens 2005) and banks (Kraft and
Tirtiroglu 1998), to mention a few.
Pros and cons
As SFA is a parametric technique, the most important question is what functional
form to impose. If we identify a functional form satisfying the criteria established
by Lau, SFA is an exceptional technique for evaluating performance. A perfect ﬁt is
on the other hand far from common in practice and usually several functional forms
must be tested. If the diﬀerent functional forms yields signiﬁcantly diﬀerent results
in TE and we do not have any clear indications of which is the most promising
form, the technique loses its credibility. The stochastic nature of the error term is
also both a strength and a weakness of SFA. The error term might capture some
sources to heterogeneity as well as measurement errors, but it might also introduce
model generated noise, even when the dataset is free of measurement errors.
The mathematical procedure of estimating the parameters through OLS and MLE
has been reported to result in unexpected results because of multicollinearity, even
for medium to weak correlation between the parameters (Gundersen 2010). The
most common solution to overcome this problem is to respecify the model or to ex-
tend or reject parts of the dataset. This problem is known as the skewness issue
and might cause problems even for correct speciﬁed functional forms (Simar and
Wilson 2010). The best known solution is to use Bayesian MCMC instead of OLS
and MLE, but this might introduce monte carlo generated noise and the param-
eters estimated might deviate from production theory where output is assumed
to be nondecreasing with increased outputs (Gundersen 2010). The occurrence
of multicollinearity is even greater for SFA formulations with multiple inputs and
outputs.
The obstacles described above makes the estimation of TE diﬃcult, and the tech-
nique require extensive skills from the user. Event hough SFA requires extensive
skills the possibility of ﬁne-tuning the model is low.
Use in incentive system
SFA seems to be little exploited for performance evaluation in incentive systems
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and the literature is concentrated around regulatory methods of ﬁrms, especially
for the electricity industry (Knittel 2002, Jamasb and Pollitt 2001) and optimal
structures of CEO compensations (Habib and Ljungqvist 2005).
SFA has its strength in balancing multiple inputs or outputs, and might cope for
heterogeneity to some extent through the error term. While satisfying the criterion
of giving a balanced measurement, the technique is less satisfactory on the other
criteria. As stated above, estimation diﬃculties and choices regarding functional
form makes the technique less attractive. The technique is likely to be regarded as
a black box where the transparency is low, so that costs regarding implementing
and communicating the model increase. A well speciﬁed functional form of the
production function would yield high credibility, but is diﬃcult to select. SFA
is not corruptible in means of lobbying by agents, but the error term might in
fact introduce uncontrollable risk on the agents. The reports of parameters that
not conform to production theory might also lower the credibility of the technique
signiﬁcantly.
4.3.3 Proposed Technique for Estimating Technical Eﬃ-
ciency
There are written many articles comparing SFA and DEA in light of regular per-
formance evaluation, but there are controversies about which is the best method.
SFA is assumed to provide better estimations when measurement errors are present
and when the functional form is known to some extent. Under a well-speciﬁed
functional form SFA require less observations than the DEA to make a good ap-
proximation of the frontier, but is poor when it comes to multicollinearity. In
an article by Mortimer (2002) the author compare the results from 41 articles
reporting eﬃciency scores from both DEA and SFA and ﬁnd medium to strong
correlations. There are no obvious diﬀerence in which technique calculating the
highest average score, but DEA normally identify more eﬃcient units than SFA,
while having a larger variance in eﬃciency scores. For a good paper summarizing
comparisons between DEA and SFA, the reader is advised to read an article by
Lin and Tseng (2005).
The fact that DEA identify more eﬃcient DMUs than SFA is supported by the
larger ﬂexibility of DEA compared to SFA. In cases where DEA identify multiple
eﬃcient DMUs, the technique is not suﬃcient to identify the best employee. SFA
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are more likely to identify one unique eﬃciency score as the best unit, but low
variance in eﬃciency scores might seem like a problem. This is particularly true
when Bayesian MCMC is used for estimating parameters as the ranking of units
might change.
DEA seems as a far more intuitive method than SFA with a signiﬁcant higher
transparency. This is likely to make DEA easier to accept by its users, as well as
lowering the ex ante and ex post costs related to implementing and monitoring.
DEA is also implicit conform with production theory of a monotonic and non-
decreasing frontier, opposed to SFA. These ﬁnal remarks are summarized in table
4.1.
Atr. Cred. Balanced Non-corruptible Transaction cost
DEA 2 2 3 3 2
SFA 1 2 3 2 1
Table 4.1: The higher score, the better. Note that DEA is balanced in general only if
assurance regions are used.
From table 4.1 one can see that DEA perform better than SFA on all criteria.
DEA is therefore assumed to be the preferred technique for estimating technical
eﬃciency in incentive systems.
4.4 Productivity Change Estimation
Productivity is normally described as the number of outputs over the number of
inputs:
productivity =
y
x
(4.18)
While being easy to calculate for one input and output, the calculation become
more diﬃcult as multiple inputs or outputs are introduced. In such cases we have
to perform some kind of aggregation to obtain a ratio for productivity. While KPIs
are thought of as partial productivity measures, I will in the following focus on
total factor productivity and productivity change.
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Productivity change from period s to t for a single-input single-input case is mea-
sured by the ratio:
Productivity change =
yt/ys
xt/xs
=
yt/xt
ys/xs
(4.19)
This representation is intuitive and indicate that we can think of productivity
change as either the output quantity index over the input quantity index or period-
t productivity over period-s productivity. This can be represented for a multiple
input, multiple output case using ﬁrm speciﬁc production mixes, G(x, y):
Productivity change = F (xt, yt, xs, ys) =
G(yt, xt)
G(ys, xs)
(4.20)
G(x, y) being a homogeneous function of degree +1 in y and −1 in x.
In both equation (4.19) and (4.20) we must select a base period for s. Issues
regarding the selection of a base period were brieﬂy discussed in section 4.2.2, but
should be given additional attention. When comparing the productivity between
periods, we might either hold the base year ﬁxed (ﬁxed-based index) or compare
each year with the previous year (chain index) and then combine the changes to
measure change over a longer period. Ideally the change in productivity should be
the same when measuring from e.g. period t to t+ 2 through t+ 1 and between t
and t + 2 as ﬁxed base, and similarly between diﬀerent units in the same period.
If this is the case, the productivity index has the property of transitivity.
The property of transitivity is desirable as it ensure measurement consistency be-
tween units and time periods. In order to construct transitive indexes the technol-
ogy should exhibit Hicks neutrality, input and output separability and simultane-
ously homotheticity. Note that a productivity index has the property of circularity
if there are no productivity change when going from A to B to A, which is a suf-
ﬁcient but not necessary condition for transitivity (Peyrache 2010; for a detailed
summary). If the conditions are not satisﬁed, the measurement of productivity
might become biased and inconsistent, which one should strive to quantify. One,
but computational expensive, method is to measure the productivity change from
A to C through B and from A to C directly. The diﬀerence in productivity change
would then quantify a possible inconsistency of the index. With a suﬃcient number
of comparisons, this will enable us to estimate conﬁdence intervals for the scores.
According to Battese et al. (2005), measuring TFP change from one period to
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another can be carried out in four ways:
• Malmquist TFP index
• Hicks-Moorsteen TFP index
• Proﬁtability ratio (index numbers)
• Component-based approach
The component-based approach was treated in section 4.1.3, where TFP change
was measured as a product of several individual factors. The remaining measures
of productivity change will be treated in the order listed above.
4.4.1 Malmquist TFP index
The Malmquist approach as a TFP index was introduced by Caves et al. in two
papers (982a, 982b). The technique measure productivity change of a DMU by
comparing output and input vectors in period s and t based on either period-t
technology or period-s technology. Alternatively, we can measure change relative
to another DMU in the same or diﬀerent period.
An output-orientated Malmquist TFP index based on period t technology
mto(xt, yt, xs, ys) =
dto(xt, yt)
dto(xs, ys)
(4.21)
An output-orientated Malmquist TFP index based on period s technology
mso(xt, yt, xs, ys) =
dso(xt, yt)
dso(xs, ys)
(4.22)
As we can see, the Malmquist approach take use of the distance function, here
represented by the output-oriented distance function. The choice of reference
technology is arbitrary when the production possibility curve exhibit CRS, but
not necessarily for VRS. Färe et al. (1992) speciﬁed the Malmquist TFP index
as the geometric average of the two indexes based on period t technology and s
technology:
mo(xt, yt, xs, ys) =
[
mto(xt, yt, xs, ys)×mso(xt, yt, xs, ys)
]0.5
(4.23)
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In the same paper they showed that this could equally be decomposed to
mo(xt, yt, xs, ys) =
dto(xt, yt)
dso(xs, ys)︸ ︷︷ ︸
TEC
[
dso(xt, yt)
dto(xt, yt)
× d
s
o(xs, ys)
dto(xs, ys)
]1/2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
TC
(4.24)
However, while the ﬁxed base Malmquist index is transitive, the geometric average
is not. Also note that the underlying production technology is assumed to be CRS
to measure TFP change. This can easily be derived from equation (4.24), where
mo(xt, yt, xs, ys) = 1 when there are no technical change between the periods and
the ﬁrm is technical eﬃcient.
Examples of use
The Malmquist index is usually coupled with DEA and has for this reason been
applied to many of the same industries as DEA. Some examples are banking (Bukh
et al. 1995) and agriculture (Coelli and Rao 2005). The Malmquist index has
gained an increase in popularity the last years, and a search on Google Scholar
with the words Malmquist index results in 4′050 related articles.
Pros and cons
As the technique make use of distance functions, the Malmquist index relies on
either a known or well-estimated technology to provide useful results. In cases
where the technology is well-deﬁned, the Malmquist index is easy to estimate and
the decomposition might provide useful information about sources of TFP change.
The Malmquist index will on the other hand fail to accurately measure productiv-
ity change unless the underlying technology exhibits global crs (Grifell-Tatjé and
Lovell 1995). Assuming crs by default when measuring productivity change seems
little appealing and is the most negative aspect of the technique. The Malmquist
index might also turned out to be infeasible when coupled with DEA infeasible
LPs. This occur when an evaluated DMU is not a part of the reference set and
cannot be radially expanded or contracted to the frontier (solving dto(xs, ys) or
dso(xt, yt)).
Use in incentive systems
Because the Malmquist in most applications rely on distance functions estimated
by SFA or DEA, and those techniques are little exploited in reward systems, the
Malmquist index itself is also little exploited. Two papers that might be related to
incentive systems are Camanho and Dyson (2006), focusing on group performance
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and Nghiem and Coelli (2002) investigating the eﬀect of incentives on productivity.
These papers focus on the other hand on the sources of productivity growth and
not on the appraisal system itself.
As stated under pros and cons, the Malmquist index is dependent on a well-deﬁned
technology in order to provide useful results. In most cases this technology has to
be estimated by either SFA or DEA, and the Malmquist index will not be regarded
as transparent unless the procedure of deﬁning the technology is transparent as
well. This is true for satisfying the criteria of providing a balanced measurements
and being non-corruptible as well. In cases where the technology is well-deﬁned, the
ease of calculating the index yields high attractivity and provide an understandable
representation of productivity change.
The assumption of a global crs technology are likely to be regarded as an important
limitation of the technique, unless a DEA CCR model is used for estimating the
distance function or a crs technology is given. For vrs technologies, this limitation
will violate the credibility criterion and the Malmquist index should not be applied.
4.4.2 Hicks-Moorsteen TFP index
The Hicks-Moorsteen TFP index (HMTFP) was developed by Diewert (1992)
based on the work of Hicks (1961) and Moorsteen (1961). The TFP index measure
growth in output over growth in input by using output and input quantity index
numbers:
HMTFP Index =
Growth in output
Growth in input
=
Output quantity index
Input quantity index
(4.25)
From the formula we can see that we have to select measures for growth in input
and growth in output in order to calculate the HM TFP index. In his original
paper, Diewert suggested using the Malmquist output quantity index divided by
a Malmquist input quantity index. This would include both input and output dis-
tance functions, making the index simultaneously oriented. When the input and
output growth is given this simple approach is easy to calculate, but it does not
distinguish the source of productivity growth (TC or TEC). This index has also
proved to be well-deﬁned under general assumptions of vrs and strong disposabil-
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ity8, but has scarcely been empirically applied.
In a recent paper by Epure et al. (2011) the authors adopt the HMTFP index
proposed by Bjurek (1996), and tailor it for speciﬁc benchmarking perspectives:
static (1), ﬁxed base and unit (2), and dynamic TFP change (3). The static
representation of HMTPF may be expressed as follows:
HMTFPst,t =
dto(x
B
t , yt)/d
t
o(x
B
t , y
B
t )
dti(xt, y
B
t )/d
t
i(x
B
t , y
B
t )
(4.26)
where t is period for analysis and (xt, yt) is production mix for analyzed DMU
and (xBt , y
B
t ) is production mix for a set benchmark. This measure is useful if the
environment is stable, but the index does not include a time component.
If we want to track changes between periods, we may deﬁne a base year dynamic
index:
HMTFPfb,k =
dko(x
B
k , yt)/d
k
o(x
B
k , y
B
k )
dki (xt, y
B
k )/d
k
i (x
B
k , y
B
k )
(4.27)
where k is base year and t is the year under analysis. From this representation
we can see that the reference technology and benchmark are ﬁxed, which makes
it possible to track movements over time for a given DMU. However, we might
argue against a ﬁxed reference technology because the real world evolve through
technical progress9 and a static benchmark might become obsolete.
The dynamic HMTFP is similar the basic HMTFP index by Bjurek, where both
years and reference units are dynamic:
HMTFPs =
dso(xs, yt)/d
s
o(xs, ys)
dsi (xt, ys)/d
s
i (xs, ys)
(4.28)
values greater than 1 gives the DMUs improvement of TFP, while values below 1
indicate a TFP decrease.
When calculating the HMTFP index, the most applied technique is to couple with
DEA and solve four linear programs (one for each distance function). This calcu-
lation is made easy through the DPIN software developed by O'Donnell (2010a),
which also decomposes the index into sources of TFP change.
8No increase in inputs can lead to a reduction in outputs, and no reduction in outputs becomes
infeasible without an increase in inputs.
9Expansion in the production possibilities set.
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Examples of use
When searching for Hicks-Moorsteen on Google Scholar only 82 hits turned up.
Most of the articles were focusing on the favorable characteristics of HM compared
to Malmquist and only a few applications were found. Among these, one was
measuring agricultural productivity (O'Donnell 2010b) while another measured
productivity Change of UK airports (Barros and Managi 2008).
Pros and cons
Like the Malmquist index, the Hicks-Moorsteen index relies on either a known or
well-estimated technology to provide useful results. This technology might exhibit
crs as well as vrs. The work of Epure et al. has provided multiple references for
productivity change, which increases the applicability of the HM index. The HM
index is also a close representation of equation (4.19).
The downside to the HM index in light of an incentive system is the increased
computational eﬀort related to estimating four distance functions. These distance
functions might also be infeasible when coupling HMTFP with DEA and in such
cases one should either apply a DEA CCR-model, use SFA distance functions or
adapt a continuous time index.
Use in incentive systems
As the literature on HM index is sparse, articles on its applicability in incentive
systems seems to be non-existing.
Like the Malquist index, the transparency of the HM index depends on the trans-
parency of the procedure for deﬁning the distance functions, likewise for regarding
the technique as balanced and non-corruptible. As the distance functions are well-
deﬁned, the HM index provides an unbiased estimation of productivity change,
with no known violations of the credibility criterion. In terms of attractivity, the
formulation in equations (4.26) - (4.28) are slightly more complicated than equa-
tion (4.19).
4.4.3 Index Numbers
Index numbers are deﬁned as real numbers and are the most commonly used in-
struments to measure changes in productivity and other economic variables. Index
numbers are foremost used for measuring changes in total factor productivity, but
also for handling panel data sets such as price data over time and space. In order
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to do so, we have to select a base period which becomes the standard for which all
other periods are measured against. A DMU can also be used as a base while han-
dling cross-sectional data. The general index number problem can be formulated
as (Battese et al. 2005):
Vst =
∑M
m=1 pmtymt∑M
m=1 pmsyms
(4.29)
where
m : number of commodities
M : the commodity to consider
j : j-th period or DMU (j = s, t)
ymj : quantity of commodity m , period j
pmj : price of commodity m , period j
Vst : Value of the basket of quantities, (M), from periods to t
The most well known indexes are the Laspeyers and Paasche index, Fisher index
(geometric mean of Laspeyers and Paasche) and Tornquist index. The main diﬀer-
ence between these indexes is which period the index use as base period, current
or past. Apart from this, all of the mentioned techniques are multiplicative index
numbers, and the reader is referred to Diewert (2005) for a detailed discussion on
additive index numbers. In short, additive index numbers are deﬁned in forms of
diﬀerences and not ratios.
Examples of Use
Consumer price index (CPI) is perhaps the most widely used economic indicator.
In the calculation of CPI, Laspeyers, Paasche and Fisher are perhaps the most
common indexes. These indexes might yield diﬀerent results and ﬁgure 4.9 display
such diﬀerences for New Zealand consumer prices.
Pros and Cons
The indexes treated in this section are well-established in economical literature and
in practice. They common techniques for estimating the magnitude of economic
changes over time, but rely on both price and quantitative panel data and might be
diﬃcult when indexing non-ﬁnancial metrics. As the indexes are straightforward
to compute when data is obtainable, the most important aspect is measurement
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Figure 4.9: Alternative CPI indexes (Smedes 2005)
consistency in cross-sectional or panel data.
Use in Incentive Systems
While multiplicative index numbers are suitable for measuring economic change,
they are poor for handling non-ﬁnancial metrics. Index numbers share the same
attributes as KPIs, except the ability to handle input- or output data without
price information. One way to account for unavailable price information is to
obtain estimates by subjective evaluation. This said, index numbers are most
appropriate when DMUs are assumed to be proﬁt maximizers.
4.4.4 Proposed Technique for Estimating Productivity
Change
The Malmquist index in equation 4.23 and HM are identical if the technology
exhibits global CRS and is inversely homothetic (Färe et al. 1996; for formal
deﬁnition on homotheticity and proof). These necessary conditions seldom hold in
practice and the indexes will in most cases yield diﬀerent results. The Malmquist
index seems to be far more applied than the HM index, both in theory an applied
research. Some reason might be that until 2-3 years ago the Hicks-Moorsteen
was not available in software and was not decomposed in TFP change. Recent
papers have shed light over limitations of the Malmquist index as a TFP index,
and state that the Malmquist index might be infeasible under certain assumptions
while the Hicks-Moorsteen is not (Kerstens et al. 2010). O'Donnell (2010b) also
questions the Malquists productivity index properties as a TFP index and state
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that it cannot in general be expressed as the ratio of an output quantity index to
an input quantity index. [p.4].
Apart from infeasibility issues the Malmquist index does not handle VRS, which
makes it less applicable than the Hicks-Moorsteen index. The Hicks-Moorsten in-
dex is therefore the preferred productivity index under these circumstances. Index
numbers are not considered to be appropriate for overall performance evaluation
but might be exploited as possible parameters for ﬁnancial performance.
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Chapter 5
Proposed Evaluation Scheme
5.1 Summary of Reviewed Techniques
In the previous chapters, common practice for performance evaluation in incentive
systems in addition to measures of productivity change and eﬃciency are treated.
The techniques possess diﬀerent attributes and have diﬀerent strengths and weak-
nesses. Although a technique is favorable in one situation it is not necessarily
favorable in another situation. In this section, common practice will be compared
and evaluated against techniques for technical eﬃciency and productivity.
Most of the reviewed techniques may be divided into deterministic or stochas-
tic and parametric or non-parametric methods. The deterministic methods were
KPIs, Balanced Scorecard (composite measures), index numbers and DEA, while
SFA was the only stochastic technique. Deterministic methods are suitable when
measurement errors are either systematic (equally biased for all DMUs) or negli-
gible. Measurement errors will on the other hand impose uncontrollable risk on
the agent, which should be adjusted for. SFA might be more suited for handling
noisy data as it contains a stochastic error term, but the end user has little control
over how this term aﬀect uncontrollable risk. In fact, uncontrollable risk might
be generated in the model, especially if data of high quality is used. Balanced
Scorecard and SFA, and in some cases KPIs and index numbers, are parametric
methods and the principal have to be considerate regarding how the calculation is
carried out. DEA is the only non-parametric method reviewed in this thesis and
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yield greater ﬂexibility. Hicks-Moorsteen and Malmquist might belong to diﬀerent
classes depending on which technique for estimating technical eﬃciency is used.
Apart from SFA, none of the techniques adjusts for uncontrollable risk or het-
erogeneity in their original form and should be coupled with regression analysis
in order to detect diﬀerences in operational environment. Productivity change
measured by HMTFP might on the other hand adjust for heterogeneity if market
ﬂuctuations and heterogeneity is systematic.
Subjective evaluation does not fall into any of these categories, and might be
thought of as a unique technique. This technique is crucial when mostly sub-
jective data is used, and let the principal adjust for heterogeneity and observed
uncontrollable risk. The credibility of such evaluations is on the other hand highly
dependent on the managers ability to stay unaﬀected by the halo eﬀect and de-
teriorated personal preferences. As this is diﬃcult in practice, one should stress
to implement objective measures and rather use subjective evaluation to evaluate
distortion caused by imperfect objective performance measures.
Atr. Cred. Balanced Non-corruptible Transaction cost
Subjective 2 2* 3 2* 1
KPI 3 2* 1 1 3
BCS, CM 3 2* 3 2* 2
DEA 2 2 3 3 2
SFA 1 2 3 2 1
Table 5.1: The higher score, the better. *: Relies on the principal
Of the common techniques, composite measures such as BCS is the preferred
method for assessing overall performance when a pure objective evaluation is
stressed. The ﬁxed weighting of parameters makes the technique more corrupt-
ible than DEA, which is the preferred method for performance evaluation. Note
however that this is true if the principal manage to communicate the method to
the agents, where it is made simple and understandable. Nevertheless, none of the
techniques seem perfect on all criteria and should be complemented with subjective
evaluations.
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5.2 Proposed Scheme for Performance Evaluation
In the past chapters, DEA and HMTFP index have been considered to possess
the most preferred properties for implementation in incentive systems. In this
section performance evaluation scheme is proposed, in addition to providing some
additional insight on DEA and HMTFP.
Even though no technique is perfect, the most optimal way to set up an evaluation
scheme seems to be:
1. Select appropriate parameters
The quality and appropriateness of data used in the calculations are just as im-
portant as the techniques themselves. As for the approach to select appropriate
measures I will suggest the following steps:
(a) Identify possible parameters
(b) Analyze parameters
(c) Aggregate and prepare data for DEA
Identify possible parameters
For a guide on identifying possible parameters, the reader should revisit section
2.1. At this step one should focus on identifying as many possible parameters as
possible and use next step to evaluate their appropriateness. Brainstorming and
looking into parameters used by comparative businesses facilitates the process.
Analyze parameters
Identiﬁed parameters should satisfy criteria in section 2.3.1. Analyze if the param-
eters might induce employees to dysfunctional responses and if they capture value
adding actions. When coupling DEA with HM, both panel and cross sectional
data are required, so that we should pay attention to measurement consistency
through units and time. Measurement errors might lead to outliers in DEA that
aﬀect the performance evaluation of other DMUs. Pay attention to aspects that
might result in heterogeneity.
Aggregate and prepare data for DEA
In an article Preparing your data for DEA Sarkis (2007) treat important issues
related to data characteristics for DEA calculation: Reduction of dataset, imbal-
ance in data magnitudes, negative numbers and zero values, and missing data.
As the discriminating power of DEA decrease with the number of parameters the
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number of DMUs, n, should at least be n ≥ max{m ∗ s, 3(m+ s)}. One way is to
aggregate measures1 or eliminate correlated data, but the reader should also look
into principal component analysis. In some DEA software, round-oﬀ errors might
occur if we have a large imbalance in the dataset. In this case, mean-normalizing
the parameters will solve the problem (divide each observation of a parameter by
the sample mean). The basic DEA model does not cope with negative or zero
values, but multiple solutions to such occurrences are summarized by Sarkis. In
case of missing values one should preferably select other parameters or seek good
estimates.
2. Estimate eﬃciency scores (DEA)
As discussed earlier an output-oriented or input-oriented DEA-BCC model with
super-eﬃciency should be implemented. Assurance regions should be added as
additional constraints in the multiplier form, eliminating unwanted eﬃcient pro-
duction mixes. The assurance regions will ensure that eﬀort is spread out on all pa-
rameters, providing a balanced measurement. Assurance regions will also prevent
extreme specializations for the super eﬃciency model. The estimation procedure
limit subjective evaluations to a minimum, and yields a credible calculation with
a low transaction cost.
As the super-eﬃciency model might result in an infeasible model, we should adapt
the work of Cook et al. (2008). They propose a new model where super-eﬃciency is
calculated as the minimum movement in both input- and output direction needed
to reach the frontier generated by the remaining DMUs. This new proposal is
modeled for both input- and output-orientation, and provides similar results as
the original model when it yields a feasible result.
There are developed many softwares which automatically calculate the eﬃciency
scores when the parameters are given. Many of these let the user choose between
a variety of extension and are quite intuitive. In order to gain full access, most of
these programs must be paid for, especially the most sophisticated versions. See
Hollingsworth (2004) for a systematic review of available programs.
3. Adjust for heterogeneity and uncontrollable risk
In extension of the original DEA-literature, four well-established methods that
adjust for heterogeneity are suggested. Each of these methods have diﬀerent ap-
plicability, where two of the methods adjust the reference set (Banker and Morey
1Consider Hicks and Leontief conditions for aggregation of goods or services.
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1986, Charnes et al. 1981). This adjustment lets us determine which DMUs a unit
should be measured against. E.g. post oﬃces operating in rural areas are likely
to have an uneven ﬂow of customers compared to central oﬃces. By manipulat-
ing the reference sets, post oﬃces in rural areas are compared against each other,
while central oﬃces are compared against all DMUs. In the paper by Banker and
Morey, they proposed to include favorable or unfavorable variables as variables
that cannot be reduced or increased (non-discretionary variables). The ﬁrst two
approaches are good if we do not have data for environmental factors or that we
have a clear understanding about which reference set a DMU belongs to.
In all other cases, we should adjust for uncontrollable risk and heterogeneity by
regressing environmental factors against eﬃciency scores in 2. In this analysis, the
signs of the coeﬃcients of exogenous variables indicate the direction of inﬂuence,
but p-values should be reported in addition to a subjective evaluation to detect
possible arbitrariness. The eﬃciency scores are then adjusted for signiﬁcant im-
pacts, resulting in less biased scores. This method can account for many variables
and is easy to calculate.
By adjusting for heterogeneity under peer evaluation the estimation becomes more
just as diﬀerences in operational environments are accounted for. By adjusting the
scores for uncontrollable risk, employees becomes more willing to spend eﬀort on
risky tasks and the principal may adopt a higher degree of output-based pay.
4. Calculate productivity change
In order to calculate the HM-index, one might apply the DPIN software. This
program uses DEA to calculate and decompose the productivity change, but cannot
handle assurance regions or super-eﬃciency. Super-eﬃciency does not alter the
shape of the eﬃcient frontier, but assurance regions put restrictions on eﬃcient
production mixes. For technological consistency, we should include the additional
restrictions from the DEA-model to the DEA-HM calculation. For each DMU we
have to solve four linear programs, which might turn out to be infeasible because
DMUk(xt, yt+1) and DMUk(xt+1, yt) does not exist in the reference set I for
period t (same reason as for infeasibility in the super-eﬃciency model).
When infeasibility occurs, the productivity index should be discarded and we might
adapt the DEA window analysis instead. By adapting a two year rolling window
we can measure technical eﬃciency change from one period to the other, but this
technique will not yield a transitive chain index between periods. If we on the
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other hand keep adding periods to the reference set and re-estimate the scores for
all periods, we get a transitive index. This is an easy but computational expensive
technique, which provides good estimates when no technology change has occurred
between the periods.
5. Verify results by expert evaluation
Apart from selecting the appropriate parameters and determine the assurance re-
gion, all steps above might be implemented as an automatic algorithm. This would
yield a pure deterministic calculation, which relies on high quality data free from
measurement errors. As measurement errors might exist and the deterministic
calculation does not evaluate whether employees has altered the test scores, the
ﬁnal results should be supplemented with an expert evaluation. The objective of
this evaluation is to validate the model's fulﬁllment of criteria in section 2.3.2.
5.2.1 A Few Remarks
At ﬁrst glance, the proposed evaluation scheme might seem complex and is perhaps
not as straight forward as e.g. Balanced Scorecard. As noted by Sexton et al.
in the North Carolina buss case who implemented DEA for incentive purposes:
Success depend on our ability to communicate the methodology (pg. 89). While
this is true for implementing any performance evaluation scheme, it is even more
important when introducing an unfamiliar technique. If the scheme is not accepted
by its end users, it will not constitute a successful incentive system even though
the proposed scheme is thought to be superior to common evaluation schemes.
To ease the acceptance by an organization, an intuitive software facilitating all
steps should be developed. An user interface should let the principal determine
the assurance regions and give guidance on the choice between orientations and
returns-to-scale. The output from such a software should be a ranking of units
and their performance score based on either technical eﬃciency or productivity
change, in addition to a report on how environmental factors might aﬀect the
scores together with a sensitivity analysis. The report on environmental factors
may be used to adjust the ﬁnal scores, while the sensitivity analysis may give
insight on how measurement errors aﬀects the ranking. To increase the employees
willingness to participate in the incentive system the strengths of the evaluation
scheme compared to common schemes should emphasize on the reduced bias and
inaccuracy. By providing an intuitive explanation of the methodology, the scheme
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will be more transparent thus increasing user acceptance. E.g. By measuring your
performance on multiple tasks, you will be evaluated against other employees and
your own previous performance. Your performance on each task are automatically
combined into an overall assessment by a computer program, which will make you
look as good as possible compared to your peers. Diﬀerences in the operational
environment amongst employees will also be accounted for, thus providing a fair
and reliable assessment of everyone's performance. Top management will ensure
that the calculation is carried out correctly and adjust performances for factors that
may not be captured by objective measures.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
6.1 Concluding Remarks
This thesis was introduced by noting that biased and inaccurate performance evalu-
ation reduces the productivity of an organization. The objective of capturing value
adding actions by a performance evaluation scheme is challenged by the necessity
of balancing multiple measures, while being attractive and credible and mitigate
strategic responses. In the literature review of agency theory, sources to strategic
behavior in incentive systems were identiﬁed, focusing on dysfunctional behavior
and risk. On the basis of these ﬁndings, a performance evaluation technique should
be attractive, credible and non-corruptible, while balancing multiple measures at
a low transaction cost.
Common techniques for performance evaluation were argued to violate at least
one of the criteria, although they scored high on others. While subjective evalua-
tion and composite measures are good at balancing multiple measures, KPIs are
not. KPIs have on the other hand low transaction cost, but are highly corruptible
as they are unsuitable for handling the multitasking problem. In fact, all com-
mon techniques were evaluated to be corruptible to some extent. While KPIs fail
to mitigate dysfunctional responses due to the multitasking problem, subjective
evaluations give rise to unproductive rent seeking as workers seek to inﬂuence the
evaluation process.
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Technical eﬃciency and productivity have scarcely been applied in incentive sys-
tems, and an explicit evaluation of their applicability for evaluating groups or
individuals seems to be non-existing.
On the conceptual level, technical eﬃciency and productivity might cope with
strategic responses through relative performance evaluation in time and units.
Relative performance evaluation is more likely to eliminate unwanted Nash-
equilibrium and prevent rent seeking, so that the eﬀectiveness of an incentive
system is optimized. While productivity change in most cases gives a strong in-
centive to improve, empirical estimated technical eﬃciency might provide weak
incentives for the eﬃcient agents. The choice of base period might also aﬀect the
responses of agents, thus giving rise to moral hazard due to superior knowledge
about systematic market ﬂuctuations.
While both DEA and SFA are common techniques for an empirical estimation of
the production frontier, SFA seems less applicable in incentive systems. The de-
termination of an explicit functional form yield low attractivity and the stochastic
component might induce uncontrollable risk on the agent. Its ability to handle
stochastic data is out-weighted by its rather low credibility as the technique have
reported to yield infeasible results and contradict production theory in applied
research. DEA is regarded to be a more suitable technique and receive high scores
on all criteria. As proposed in section 5.2, a DEA-BCC super eﬃciency model
with assurance regions seems to be the optimal evaluation technique in general.
The automatic weighting of parameters reduce transaction cost and reduce lob-
bying which might arise in composite measures, while assurance regions eliminate
unwanted eﬃcient production mixes. The super eﬃciency model prevent weak
incentives for eﬃcient agents but might result in infeasible models, in such cases
normal eﬃciency scores should be estimated.
While evaluating techniques for measuring productivity change, the Hicks-
Moorsteen was identiﬁed as the most promising technique. The Malmquist in-
dex fail under technologies exhibiting globally vrs, and the geometric average does
not yield transitive productivity scores. The less widespread HM index is more
promising as it cope with technologies exhibiting vrs, but might be infeasible when
coupled with DEA and is twice as computational expensive as the Malmquist in-
dex.
Productivity measures might cope with environmental factors if heterogeneity is
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systematic, but uncontrollable risk and heterogeneity should be accounted for ex-
plicitly. By regressing the eﬃciency scores from DEA against environmental factors
and adjust for signiﬁcant impacts, risk is reduced. By adjusting the reference set,
we might also choose which units to be compared and further reduce heterogeneity
between units.
From the observations above, this conclusion will be ended by noting that the po-
tential for technical eﬃciency and productivity in incentive systems seem promising
from a theoretical point of view. The limited occurrence in reward systems seems
to be caused by weak links between TE and productivity and agency theory on a
group- or individual level rather than any lack of suitability. Bias and inaccuracy
in performance measures are reduced through objective calculations while subjec-
tive evaluations are minimized. Nevertheless, the results from these techniques
should be veriﬁed by expert evaluation as this will mitigate incentive distortion
caused by imperfect objective measures. The success of the proposed technique is
also highly dependent on the evaluator's ability to communicate the methodology
to its employees.
6.2 Further Work
The argumentation for why technical eﬃciency and productivity are suitable meth-
ods for performance evaluation in incentive systems is anchored in theory. Because
empirical studies of the applicability of technical eﬃciency and productivity is lack-
ing, the techniques should be investigated by applied research. The main focus
of such studies should be to explore the attractivity and transparency through
in-depth interviews, as communicability and user acceptance are believed to be
the main threats.
Other techniques for estimating technical eﬃciency should also be evaluated, such
as the StoNED method (Stochastic Non-parametric Envelopment of Data, http:
//www.nomepre.net/stoned/). This technique seeks to combine the virtues of
both DEA and SFA, but has not received any attention in this thesis as it is under
development.
Measures for productivity change in continuous time should also be explored, as
infeasibility will not occur for such indexes. Although some work has been done on
developing continuous time DEA models, no software exist for implementing the
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methodology. Further work should therefore also be directed against a development
of commercial software for empirical applications of continuous time models.
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Appendix A
Examples of KPIs
Typical indicators
Level Category Examples
Global Political Number and intensity of conﬂicts
Economic
Proportion of population below
poverty line, Degree of income
inequality
Environmental
Degree and trends in types of
pollution and strategic natural
resources depletion
Political Quality of democracy
Social
Literacy, Quality of education
and Health treatment of minority
groups
National Economic
GDP, National deﬁcits, Inﬂation,
Degree of income inequality,
Proportion of population below
poverty line
Environmental Existing levels of pollution
Financial
Return on Investment (ROI),
Economic Value Added (EVA)
Organizational Competitive
Market share trend, Ratio of new
to total products, Level of core
competencies
People
Employment stability level and
turnover, Employee empowerment
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Environmental
Environmental policies
(IS0-14000)
Process Quality
Per cent defect-free output, %
Returns, Service time, Customer
complaints
Productivity
Employee-, Material-,
Energy-productivity indicators
Cycle time
order- processing tile, set-up
change time
Work teams and
individuals Cohesiveness Team spirit
Employee
satisfaction
Degree of multi-skill training,
Suggestions for improvements
Loyalty Employee turnover
(Dervitsiotis 2004)
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Appendix B
WinBUGS code
Example code for N = 167 DMUs with one input and 7 outputs. The functional
form is Cobb-Douglas and the probability density function is half-normal.
Code:
model
{
for (i in 1:N) {
u[i] ~ dnorm.trunc0(0,lambda)I(0,1000)
eff[i] <- exp(- u[i])
}
for ( k in 1:K ) {
firm[k] <- data[k, p + 1]
mu[k] <- alpha - u[firm[k]] + inprod(beta[1:p], data[k, 1:p]) +
beta[p + 1] * data[k, 1] * data[k, 1]
y[k] ~ dnorm(mu[k], prec)
}
lambda0 <- 1/37.5
lambda ~ dgamma(1, lambda0)
alpha ~ dnorm(0.0, 1.0E-06)
for (i in 1:p+1) {
beta[i] ~ dnorm(0.0, 1.0E-06)
}
prec ~ dgamma(0.001, 0.001)
sigmasq <- 1 / prec
tot <-sum(eff[])/N
}
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list(y=c(...),
data=structure(.Data=c(...), .Dim=c(167,9)),N=167,K=167,p=8)
list(u=c(1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1
,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1),
lambda=10,alpha=-8,prec=1,beta=c(0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0))
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